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International trade brings welfare gains from specialization, but generates in-
equality because production factors differ across industries and firms. This disser-
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inequality and welfare. The first chapter studies the impacts of international trade
and technical change on the skill premium through structural change. The second
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structure when heterogeneous firms can adopt more specialized technologies.
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premium in all countries; (2) trade and technical change each explains half of the
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Chapter 1: International Trade, Structural Change and the Skill Pre-
mium
1.1 Introduction
Over the past 20 years, both developed and developing countries have experi-
enced a rapid pace of globalization. Many of these countries have also experienced
large increases in the skill premium, measured by the wage ratio of college grad-
uates to non-college graduates.1 Figure 1.1 illustrates that around two thirds of
countries experienced rising skill premium from 1997 to 2007, including both ad-
vanced economies, such as the U.S. and Italy, and emerging ones, such as China and
Brazil. While there has been considerable research on the role of trade and skill-
biased technical change in skill premium, to date there is no conclusive evidence on
their relative importance.
Another important feature of the global economy has been the substantial
reallocation of economic activity across broad sectors, i.e., structural change. There
have been substantial shifts from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector in
developing countries, and from the manufacturing to the services sector in developed
1See, for example, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for evidence of rising skill premium in devel-
oping countries in the 1990s.
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countries. These structural changes may further increase the skill premium because
skill intensity in production is the highest in services and the lowest in agriculture.
As such, I examine the roles of trade and technical change on the skill pre-
mium in the presence of structural change. Specifically, I address the following two
questions. First, to what extent have recent fundamental shocks, which affect trade
and technical change, impacted the skill premium across countries? Second, how
are the impacts from these fundamental shocks affected by structural change across
developed and developing countries?
I address these questions by first developing a multi-sector, multi-country gen-
eral equilibrium trade model based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Caliendo and
Parro (2015), augmented with elements of structural change. I divide the econ-
omy into agriculture, manufacturing, and services, where goods from all sectors
are tradable. The production factors include skilled and unskilled labor as well as
intermediate inputs from each sector, so that the model allows for input-output
linkages. Structural change is driven by endogenous changes in expenditure shares.
For households, it is due to nonhomothetic preferences, while for firms, it is through
changes in expenditures on intermediate goods.
The framework allows me to perform a structural decomposition exercise to
quantify the relative importance of alternative explanations, in the spirit of the
accounting approach used in Eaton et al. (2016). Specifically, changes between any
two periods can be fully explained by six types of country-specific shocks: (i) changes
in the bilateral trade cost between each pair of trading partners in each sector, (ii)
changes in each sector’s production efficiency, (iii) changes in each sector’s skill
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intensity, (iv) changes in the supply of skilled and unskilled labor, (v) changes in
trade deficits, and (vi) changes in the model residuals.23 After retrieving these
shocks, I combine them into trade and technology shocks, which affect both within
and between sectoral reallocations, so that I can quantify their relative importance
on the changes in the skill premium.
I apply the framework to 37 countries from 1997 to 2007, a period when
global trade values increased by more than 50%. I retrieve data on production,
factor payments, consumption, and bilateral trade from four versions of the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), corresponding to 1997, 2001, 2004, and 2007. In
addition, I assemble data on skill premium from various sources for each sample
country. Based on my framework, I use these data to estimate model parameters
and retrieve the shocks on trade and technology.
The model generates a gravity equation that relates bilateral trade flows to
country-sector price indices, which I obtain using an approach similar to that of
Parro (2013) and Reyes-Heroles (2016). The gravity structure also allows me to
recover sectoral bilateral trade costs and production efficiency. Since the supply of
labor is exogenous in the framework, the shocks to the relative supply of skilled
labor are adjusted to be consistent with the observed skill premium. I measure skill
intensity by the cost share of skilled labor in total labor payments. Shocks to total
employment and trade deficits are also obtained directly from the data.
2Trade deficits in my framework are exogenous because there are no capital accumulation and
household saving decisions as in Eaton et al. (2016).
3The residual shocks include the ones from the estimation of household expenditures and in-
termediate expenditures as well as changes in the value added share.
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The estimated sectoral prices allow for the calibration of parameters of house-
hold expenditure and a firm’s intermediate expenditure, by matching the model-
implied household expenditure share and firm intermediate expenditure share with
the data counterparts. I employ an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), which
allows for changes in real income and relative sectoral prices to affect household ex-
penditure shares across sectors.4 Changing intermediate expenditure shares across
sectors is possible by modeling a translog expenditure function for intermediates.5
These calibrated demand parameters and the shocks allow me to replicate
the data on production share, household expenditure share, trade flows, and skill
premium in 1997 and 2007. Instead of applying each shock individually to the
model, I classify them into shocks on the labor supply, trade, technology, and model
residuals so that I can attribute the observed changes in the skill premium to trade
and technical change.
The trade shocks consist of three components. The first are bilateral trade
costs. The second are shocks to country-specific trade deficits. The third is related
to changes in the production efficiency of foreign countries, since in this framework
foreign productivity growth affects the home country through trade only. On the
technology side, I include shocks to skill intensity and home production efficiency,
i.e., neutral technical change. By feeding each mutually exclusive group of shocks
4Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) also use AIDS to show that poor consumers gain more
from trade as they consume more tradable goods, which are less income elastic.
5Two channels drive endogenous changes in intermediates expenditure share. First, each sec-
tor uses its own intermediates intensively, so any structural change is amplified through sectoral
linkages, as in Cravino and Sotelo (2016) and Sposi (2015). Second, sectoral relative prices af-
fect intermediates expenditure share through cross sectoral price elasticity terms in the translog
specification.
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separately into the model, I quantify the relative importance of trade and technical
change on the changes in the skill premium. Several results emerge.
I find that both trade and technical change made significant contributions to
the increases in the skill premium from 1997 to 2007. Trade increases the skill
premium in all countries, with a median of 8% across countries. The effects of trade
are larger in countries that experienced significant reductions in trade costs, such
as China, and in those more exposed to the global economy, such as Ireland and
Luxembourg. On the other hand, the average effects of technical change are smaller
and very heterogenous across countries. The model interprets some countries that
experienced decreases in the skill intensity within certain sectors, such as Peru, as
negative effects from skill-biased technical change.
I gauge the relative importance of trade and technical change by focusing on
two-thirds of countries in my sample, in which technical change increases the skill
premium. I find that trade and technical change each explain half of the increases
in the skill premium. Lastly, the changes in the relative supply of skilled labor
increased during this period, contributing to a decrease in the skill premium.
This approach also allows for identifying trade as a quantitatively important
conduit for foreign technical change to affect home skill premium. By feeding each
type of trade shocks separately into the framework, I find that changes in foreign
production efficiency are responsible for the positive effects of trade on the skill
premium, while changes in the trade cost and deficits have negligible or negative
effects. This implies that, in order to get a complete picture of the effects of trade
on the skill premium, we have to consider the effects from foreign technical change.
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To investigate the effects of structural change on the skill premium, I impose a
Cobb-Douglas expenditure structure on households and firms.6 The simple model is
similar to the standard multi-sector general equilibrium trade model (e.g., Caliendo
and Parro (2015)), into which I feed the same set of shocks and compare with the
baseline to obtain the effects due to structural change. There are two main findings.
First, the trade effects via foreign technical change are halved once structural change
is shut down. The reason is that the shocks to sectoral production efficiency are the
main driver of structural change in the model.7 Second, structural change increases
the skill premium more in developing countries relative to developed countries, as
growth in own sectoral production efficiency has been larger in developing countries.
Finally, I apply the framework to study the effects of trade and technical
change on sectoral reallocations in the U.S. and China from 1997 to 2007, by feeding
in U.S. and China specific shocks. Specifically, the shocks include changes in the
relative supply of skilled labor, skill intensity, production efficiency, and trade deficits
in the U.S. and China, as well as changes in the bilateral trade cost between the
two countries.
In the case of the U.S., the model predicts that trade with China explains more
than half of the decline in the manufacturing production share, while increases in the
production efficiency of the U.S. explain one-third of the decline. In terms of labor
6This implies that there are no endogenous changes in household and economy-wide interme-
diate expenditure shares.
7The result that structural change is mainly driven by changes in sectoral production efficiency is
consistent with the work on structural change. See, for example, Swiecki (2014). In my framework,
structural change is mainly due to the income effect from nonhomothetic preferences and the
amplification effect from the intensive usage of own intermediates in each sector.
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reallocations, trade and technical change reallocate 1.6% of the skilled workers out
of the shrinking manufacturing to services, but only 0.2% of the unskilled workers.
Therefore, I contribute to recent studies on the distributional impacts of imports
from China on the U.S. local labor markets by providing a general equilibrium
assessment.8
In the case of China, the model reveals that trade and technical change to-
gether explain almost all of the sectoral reallocations from agriculture to manufac-
turing. Labor reallocations are characterized by the unskilled workers moving from
agriculture to manufacturing, leading to a 6.6% increase in the manufacturing em-
ployment share of the unskilled workers. These predictions are consistent with the
process of structural transformation in China.9
My work bridges two recent research strands. The first focuses on quantifying
the effects of trade and technical change on the skill premium, and the second focuses
on structural change.
Most recent studies attempting to explain the impact of trade on the skill
premium focus on within sector variation of skill intensity.10 In this literature, in-
ternational trade reallocates market share to the more productive and skill-intensive
firms so that the demand for the skilled increases. In my framework, this channel
is captured in the exogenous changes in the skill intensity within each sector. From
8See, for example, Autor et al. (2013, 2014) on the effects of imports from China on the U.S.
labor markets.
9See, for example, Brandt et al. (2008) on structural transformation in China.
10See, for example, Burstein and Vogel (2016) for technology skill complementarity, Parro (2013)
for capital skill complementarity, Verhoogen (2008) for quality upgrading in Mexico, and Bustos
(2011a) for skill upgrading in Argentina.
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the data below, increases in skill intensity are concentrated in the least tradable
services sector, which casts doubt on the quantitative importance of this within
channel. Nonetheless, incorporating this channel into my framework will strengthen
the effects of trade on the skill premium, as some effects from skill-biased technical
change are attributable to trade.
Methodologically, my work is related to Caron et al. (2014) and Fieler (2011),
who also use nonhomothetic preferences. They explore nonhomotheticity to explain
why rich countries trade more with each other, whereas I use it as a natural motive
for structural change.
My work contributes to the literature on structural change by connecting it
to the changes in the skill premium in an open economy setting. Buera et al.
(2015) build a two-sector closed economy model and show that reallocations to the
skill intensive services sector due to structural change explain around 30% of the
observed increases in the skill premium in advanced economies, while the rest are due
to skill-biased technical change. I complement their results by showing that trade
also increases the skill premium through structural change, and most positive effects
of trade on the skill premium come from productivity growth in foreign countries.
My work also relates to the literature that investigates the determinants of
structural change. For example, Swiecki (2014) attributes the observed struc-
tural change to trade, sectoral technical change, nonhomothetic demand, and inter-
sectoral wedges, while I find that technical change, sectoral linkages and nonhomo-
thetic demand are relatively more important drivers of structural change.
Finally, Cravino and Sotelo (2016) also quantify the effects of trade-induced
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structural change on the skill premium. They find that, between 1995 and 2007,
trade increased the skill premium by an average of 4% across countries. My work
differs in several aspects. First, they only compute the effects of trade, while I
separately identify the effects of trade and technical change. Doing so is important
both because changes in production efficiency are the major drivers of structural
change, and because the impacts of trade are reflected through changes in the for-
eign production efficiency, as my results highlight. The second key difference is that
Cravino and Sotelo (2016) only allow for structural change from the goods to the
services sector, whereas I also include the agricultural sector. Therefore, my frame-
work captures the important structural change from agriculture to manufacturing in
developing countries, which is an important source of the increases in skill premium.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the data
on skill intensity and structural change. Section 1.3 builds the theoretical frame-
work. Section 1.4 discusses the strategy to retrieve exogenous shocks and calibrate
the model parameters. Section 1.5 uses the framework to conduct counterfactuals,
which investigate the effects of trade and technical change on the changes in the
skill premium. Section 1.6 presents an application of the model to study sectoral
reallocations in the U.S. and China. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter.
1.2 A First Look at the Data
In this section, I present some aspects of the data that concern the evolution
of the skill premium, skill intensity, and structural change in my sample countries
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from 1997 to 2007.
Figure 1.1 plots the observed changes in the skill premium in each country,
measured by the changes in the ratio of wage of the college workers to the non-
college workers, against log real GDP per worker. It shows that around two-thirds
of the countries experienced increases in the skill premium, including both developed
and developing countries. Moreover, the experiences across countries reveal a lot of
heterogeneity. Some countries, such as China and Italy, have an increase in the skill
premium of over 10%. Some other countries, like Chile and France, have a decrease
in the skill premium of over 10%. In my framework, I will connect the observed
changes in the skill premium to different shocks.
The reason that why structural change affects the skill premium is that sectors
have different skill intensity. Table 1.1 presents the data on skill intensity (βk) in
each sector, measured as the share of wage payments to the skilled workers in total
labor cost.11 The left panel reveals that the services sector is most skill intensive
while the agriculture sector is least skill intensive. The right panel shows that in
OECD countries the services sector has the largest increase in skill intensity, while
all three sectors in non-OECD countries experience increases in skill intensity. The
changes in skill intensity within each sector are one of the shocks that affect the
changes in skill premium.
Now I go to the data on structural change. I measure structural change by
changes in the production share of each sector: yk = value of output in sector k
total value of output
. The first
11In the model the skilled and unskilled labor are combined with a Cobb-Douglas technology, so
the skill intensity is directly measured by the cost share of the skilled labor.
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three columns of Table 1.6 present the changes in production share in each sector
from 1997 to 2007. In OECD countries, sectoral reallocation is from agriculture
and manufacturing to services, while the pattern of structural change in non-OECD
countries is from agriculture to manufacturing and services. Together with the
observation that the services sector is most skill intensive and the agriculture sector is
least skill intensive, structural change may increase the skill premium in all countries.
Changing household expenditure across sectors influences structural change.
Table 1.2 shows the average household expenditure share on each sector. Looking
at the levels in the left panel, OECD countries consume relatively more goods from
services and less goods from agriculture than non-OECD countries. The changes in
household expenditure share are mainly characterized by switching from agriculture
to services. The upper panel of Figure 1.2 shows that the changes in household ex-
penditure share are positively correlated with structural change. These observations
indicate the role of income differences in explaining the consumption patterns across
countries, if goods from services are more income elastic than agriculture. In my
model, household preferences are nonhomothetic to capture this potential income
effect.
Changes in firms’ expenditure shares for intermediates across sectors also affect
structural change. I define the intermediates expenditure share ekl as the ratio of the
cost of intermediates from sector l to sector k’s total intermediates cost. Table 1.3
presents the average intermediates expenditure share in each sector. From the left
panel, we see that each sector uses its own intermediates intensively. This implies
that any change in production share is amplified through sectoral linkages. From the
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right panel, we see that each sector uses more skill-intensive services intermediates
overtime.
What matters for structural change is the changes in average intermediate
expenditure share for each sector ek, defined as ek = yAeAk + yMeMk + ySeSk.
The lower panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates that the changes in average intermediate
expenditure share are highly positively correlated with structural change in each
sector.
To capture the rich input-output linkages that are important for structural
change, total intermediates expenditure is translog and sector specific, to incorporate
both the intensive usage of own sector intermediates and to allow relative sectoral
prices to influence the sectoral intermediates expenditure share.
1.3 Model
The static trade model is based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Caliendo
and Parro (2015). The world economy has n = 1, . . . , N countries, each with three
tradable sectors: agriculture (A), manufacturing (M), and services (S). Let Ω =
{A,M, S} denotes the set of all sectors. Country n is endowed with Un units of
unskilled labor, and Sn units of skilled labor.
Output in each sector is a CES aggregate (with constant elasticity of substi-
tution σ) of the outputs of a unit continuum of goods (different across each sector)
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Country n’s efficiency zkn(j) at making good j in sector k is
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the realization of a random variable zkn distributed as:
F kn (z) = Pr(z
k






drawn independently across each good j in country n. Here, T kn reflects the overall
production efficiency in country n sector k, and the parameter θk is an inverse
measure of the dispersion of productivities.
Households consume outputs from all sectors with a preference structure of the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). Production of good j in each sector combines
the services of each type of labor and intermediates from each of the three sectors.
Technology is such that the intermediates from each sector are aggregated into a
composite intermediates bundle with translog technology, and the composite bundle
is further combined with two labor inputs following a Cobb-Douglas technology with
constant returns to scale.
Trade in the outputs of the three sectors incurs standard iceberg costs, such
that delivering one unit of output from country i to country n requires κkni ≥ 1 units,
with κknn = 1. Taking into account the ad valorem tariff rate τ
k
ni ≥ 0, the trade cost
from country i to country n is dkni =
(





The preference of household h in country n is AIDS, as in Fajgelbaum and
Khandelwal (2016). The preference is defined by expenditure share on goods from
12There is no tariff in the services sector, so τSni = 0.
13
each sector, skn(h):
skn(h) = αk + δkA lnP
A
n + δkM lnP
M
n + δkS lnP
S






where In(h) is household h’s income and P
k
n is sectoral price level. The overall price




















k∈Ω αk = 1,
∑
k∈Ω δkl = 0,
∑
k∈Ω bk = 0 so that the expenditure shares
add up to 1. In addition,
∑
l∈Ω δkl = 0 and δkl = δlk correspond to the homogeneity
and symmetry assumptions, so the AIDS is well defined.
Notice here that the substitution patterns between sectors are translog, so that
it is more flexible than the usual CES considered in the structural change literature.
If the income elasticity of demand bk 6= 0, preferences are nonhomothetic. In sum,
the AIDS specification captures complementarity across sectors and nonhomothetic-
ity, both of which are important in explaining structural change from the side of
household demand.
1.3.1.1 Aggregation
The AIDS is easily aggregated to the economy level household expenditure
share skn:
skn = αk + δkA lnP
A
n + δkM lnP
M









k ∈ Ω, (1.2)
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where Īn is the average income of consumers in each country, and Thn is the Theil
index of inequality.13 Note that the preferences are the same across the countries,
but the expenditure shares are different because real income per capita, the Theil
index and the relative prices vary. In the quantitative exercises I use those variations
in the data to estimate the parameters of the demand system.
1.3.2 Technology
1.3.2.1 Composite Intermediates Bundle
In each sector, intermediates from different sectors are combined with a translog



































so that the translog cost function is well defined. The share of intermediates from









for k, l ∈ Ω. The intermediates expenditure share differs across sectors, as the
constant terms γkln , and the price elasticities η
k
lm are sector specific. Notice that
if all the price elasticities equal to zero, the intermediates expenditure shares are
constant, which corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas technology.
13See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
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1.3.2.2 Firm’s Problem
The firm producing good j in country n sector k solves the following cost
minimization problem:





















where lu, ls, and M
k
n are the demand for unskilled labor, skilled labor, and composite





wages paid to the unskilled and skilled labor, respectively.
Perfect competition implies that the price of good j in country n sector k is:
pkn(j) = min
{
pkni(j) : i = 1, . . . , N
}
,




ni is the price charged by a firm in country i shipping to
country n.
1.3.3 Equilibrium Relationships
In this section, I list the equilibrium outcomes of the model that I will later
take to the data.
1.3.3.1 Prices and Trade Shares
From the firm’s cost minimization problem, the unit cost ckn of producing in















where rkn is given by (1.3), and the price level in country n sector k, after combining
production costs in each country, is:



















, and Γ(·) is the Gamma function.
























is the multilateral resistance term.
1.3.3.2 Market Clearing
Denote Xkn as the value of country n’s total spending on sector k, and Y
k
n as





1 + τ kin
Xki . (1.8)
Using (1.2) and (1.4), total spending on goods from sector k is the sum of household






(1− vln)elkn Y ln, (1.9)
















is the total income of
households in country n, consisting of wage payments wunUn + w
s
nSn, trade deficits














Clearing in the competitive market for each type of labor implies that total

































As the model is static, trade deficits are just exogenous transfers between countries.14
1.3.4 The Exogenous Variables
For the purpose of the quantitative exercises, I divide exogenous variables of
the model into constant parameters Θ and one time shocks Ψ:
Θ = {αk, δkl, bk, γkln , ηklm, θk} and Ψ = {κkni, τ kni, T kn , βkn, vkn, Un, Sn, Dn},
for k, l,m ∈ Ω, and n, i = 1 . . . N . Equations (1.2) through (1.11) determine the
endogenous variables, which include wages wun, w
s
n, prices of intermediates bundle
rkn, prices P
k
n , trade shares π
k
ni, household expenditure shares s
k
n, total spending X
k
n,
output Y kn for sectors k ∈ Ω, and intermediates expenditure shares ekln for k, l ∈ Ω.
Shocks in the framework affect structural change through their effects on sec-
toral prices and the real income, which in turn affect household expenditure shares
14When solving the model, I normalize the total world expenditure
∑N
n=1Xn = 1. Trade deficits




and intermediates expenditure shares according to (1.2) and (1.4). In addition, sec-
toral linkages amplify the structural change due to intensive usage of own sector
intermediates.
1.3.5 Connecting Shocks to the Skill Premium
In my framework, shocks affect the skill premium through four channels.
The first channel relates to the shock to skill intensity βkn. A larger β
k
n implies
that the sector becomes more skill intensive in production, so that the relative
demand for the skilled labor increases. It can be interpreted as skill-biased technical
change (SBTC). The changes in βkn are exogenous to other types of shocks in the
model.
The second channel comes from the shock to skill abundance Sn
Ln
. An increase
in the relative supply of the skilled labor Sn
Ln
decreases the skill premium.
The third channel is based on the Hechscher-Ohlin theory. Countries that are
skill abundant (with high Sn
Ln
) tend to be net exporters in the skill-intensive services
sector, so trade increases the skill premium. On the other hand, countries that are
skill scarce are likely to be net exporters in the skill-unintensive agriculture sector,
so trade decreases the skill premium in these countries. Changes in trade costs
{κkni, τ kni}, trade deficits Dn, sectoral production efficiency T kn , and skill abundance
Sn
Ln
affect the magnitude of the Hechscher-Ohlin force.
The final channel relates to the endogenous changes in household and inter-
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mediates expenditure shares, which affect structural change directly.15 Structural
change is mainly due to shocks to sectoral production efficiency. Home technical
change affects structural change in the domestic economy directly. Foreign techni-
cal change affects structural change in foreign countries, which in turn affects the
home country through trade.
The effects of all shocks on the skill premium depends on the strength of each
of the four channels.
1.3.6 Structural Change and the Skill Premium
How do trade and technical change affect the skill premium through structural
change? In this subsection, I make some simplifying assumptions to study the effects
of structural change on the skill premium. I assume that there are two countries,
N = 2; two sectors, k = a, b, and sector b is the skill-intensive (βbn > β
a
n) and
income-elastic (bb > 0 > ba) sector; and that the value added share is the same
across sectors and countries, vkn = v. Details are provided in Appendix A.3.












vskn + (1− v)ekn
]∑
k={a,b} (1− βkn) [vskn + (1− v)ekn]
, (1.12)








n is the average intermediates expenditure share on sector
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. If a country has a comparative
15Hechscher-Ohlin force relies on sectoral reallocation, and therefore it is also one channel that
affects structural change.
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advantage in skill-intensive sector b, then the country is a net exporter of the skilled
labor (FCTn(S) > 0) and a net importer of the unskilled labor (FCTn(U) < 0).
Therefore, international trade raises the skill premium in a country with a compar-
ative advantage in the skill-intensive sector and decreases the skill premium in a
country with comparative disadvantage in the skill-intensive sector.
Structural change at foreign country −n also affects the factor content of trade
at home. Given the same trade shares, if foreign households and firms have larger
expenditure shares on goods from skill-intensive sector b, the home country is more
likely to be a net exporter in sector b. Therefore, changes in factor content of trade
of the skilled at home is positive (∆FCTn(S) > 0), while the changes in the factor
content of trade of the unskilled is negative (∆FCTn(U) < 0), leading to an increase
in the skill premium at home.
The second part on the right-hand side of (1.12) captures the effects of struc-
tural change at home on the skill premium. It includes the changes in expenditure
shares due to both households and firms. As the changes in numerator and denom-





























)′−skn is the difference in the household expenditure share between
two periods. Over time, households demand relatively more sector b goods due to
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gains from trade or technology progress if preferences are nonhomothetic. This in
turn implies that ∆sbn > 0, which increases the skill premium.
































The between-sector component is non-zero when the intermediates expenditure
share differs across sectors.16 If each sector uses its own intermediates intensively
(eaan , e
bb
n > 1), reallocation to skill-intensive sector b (∆y
b
n > 0) increases the skill
premium. The within-sector component is active when changes in the intermedi-
ates expenditure share are non-zero within each sector. If each sector uses more
skill-intensive intermediates over time (∆eaan < 0 and ∆e
bb
n > 0), the skill premium
increases. The sign of the interaction term is in general ambiguous, and depends on
which sector has the larger changes in the intermediates expenditure share.
1.4 Taking the Model to the Data
In this section, I estimate the parameters of the model and back out the
shocks. I use data mainly from Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) versions 5
to 8, corresponding to the years 1997, 2001, 2004, and 2007, to 38 countries including
the rest of the world (ROW). I use data on total expenditure Xkn(t), output Y
k
n (t),
16By definition, ekan + e
kb













and bilateral trade flows Xkni(t) to compute production shares y
k
n and trade shares
πkni for k ∈ Ω.17 I take total employment Ln(t) from the Penn World Tables 8.1 and




(t) from various sources. Details on how I assemble the data
are provided in Appendix A.2.
The procedure of quantification involves two major steps. In the first step, I
retrieve sectoral prices P kn from the model-implied gravity equation on trade flows.
Armed with sectoral prices and other observables from the data, I estimate the
demand parameters Θd = {αk, δkl, bk, γkln , ηklm} and back out the shocks Ψ. In the
end, the model replicates the trade share, production share, consumption share, and
skill premium in each country in 1997 and 2007.
1.4.1 Sectoral Prices
In this section I show how to get sectoral prices by estimating a model-implied
gravity equation. More precisely, I identify sectoral prices relative to a base country
(ROW) from the estimates of country fixed effects in the gravity equation.18
Starting from (1.7), dividing the trade share from country i to country n by











)−θk]− ln [T kn (ckn)−θk]− θk ln dkni, (1.15)
where dkni =
(
1 + τ kni
)
κkni. As the iceberg cost κ
k
ni is unknown, I further parameterize


















18The procedure I employ is similar to that used by Parro (2013) and Reyes-Heroles (2016).
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, with the assumption of no asymmetry in iceberg cost
(ζkni = ζ
k














The only unknown parameter here is the trade elasticity θk, which I set as θk = 4
for k ∈ Ω from the estimates of Simonovska and Waugh (2014a).19
Moving the part of the trade costs that is known, which includes tariff
(
1 + τ kni
)
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Everything on the left hand side of (1.16) is either taken from the data or assigned,
and I estimate (1.16) by OLS for each year sector.
The sectoral relative price P kn for each year is identified from either the im-













1.4.2 Backing out Shocks






n}, I can back out the following shocks without knowing the
19I also use θk = 3 and θk = 5 to check whether my results are affected.
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equilibrium wages:
















2. I compute the value added shares vkn directly from the data, measured as the
ratio of total labor payments to total production costs.
3. I compute the skill intensity βkn directly from the data, measured as the ratio
of payments to the skill labor to total labor payments.
4. I compute the total labor force Ln directly from the data on total employment
in country n.
5. Dividing the two expressions in (1.10), I retrieve the relative supply of the






















Together with the values on Ln, I know the Sn and Un levels.
6. I compute trade deficits Dn directly from the data.
To back out sectoral production efficiency T kn and estimate demand parameters




n. This can be done by first
20An alternative way to recover the trade costs is to use the bilateral residuals ζkni from (1.16)






ni. These two methods give the same trade costs.
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using (1.8) and (1.11) to solve for equilibrium outputs Y kn and then solving for the
wages using (1.9) and (1.19).
To back out sectoral production efficiency, I calculate the equilibrium values








I estimate the AIDS parameters {αk, δkl, bk} by minimizing the distance be-
tween the model-implied household expenditure shares s̃kn(t) from (1.2) and the
expenditure shares from the data skn(t):











Similarly, I estimate the translog intermediates cost parameters {γkln , ηklm} by min-
imizing the distance between the model-implied intermediates expenditure shares
ẽkln (t) from (1.4) and the respective shares from the data e
kl
n (t) sector by sector:








ekln (t)− ẽkln (t)
]2
, k ∈ Ω.
To match household expenditure shares in the data, I regard the residuals
from the estimation of AIDS as another shock, which I call the preference shifters:
akn(t) = s
k
n(t)− s̃kn(t), k ∈ Ω, n = 1, . . . , N. (1.21)
For the model to match production shares and therefore structural changes in the
data, the model-implied intermediates expenditure shares have to be internally con-
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sistent with the aggregate intermediates expenditure share ekn(t) implied by (1.9).
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I match production shares by finding input shifters gkln (t), which minimizes the dis-
tance to the residuals from the estimation of intermediates cost parameters in each
year sector:























gkln (t) = 0,
where the first restriction ensures that the model matches the production shares in
the data.22
The procedure delivers the constant parameters Θ and one time shocks Ψ =
{κkni, τ kni, T kn , βkn, vkn, Un, Sn, Dn, akn, gkln } of the baseline model. By construction, the
solution to the baseline model matches the trade shares πkni, household expenditure
shares skn, production shares y
k
n, and skill premium
wsn
wun
in both the initial (1997) and
the end (2007) equilibria.
1.4.4 Values of Exogenous Parameters
Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 summarize the baseline demand parameters.
For the AIDS parameters in Table 1.4, the values of income elasticities bk indi-
cate that goods from the agriculture sector are necessities, while goods from the ser-







22Simply matching the intermediates expenditure shares in the data does not work, as I do not
have factors such as capital and land in the model.
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estimates from the structural change literature, which find services to be the luxury
sector. The estimates of price elasticities δkl reveal that goods from the agriculture
and services sectors are in general complements to other sectors (δAA, δSS > 0), while
goods from the manufacturing sector are substitutes (δMM < 0). The estimates here
are consistent with the final expenditure approach in Herrendorf et al. (2013), who
find that substitutability between sectors is close to a Cobb-Douglas utility.
Table 1.5 presents the estimates on the price elasticities of the translog inter-
mediates cost function. In general, intermediates from all sectors are complements
to each other in the agriculture sector and substitutes to each other in the manu-
facturing and services sector.
Table 1.7 summarizes the baseline shocks. I report the cumulative changes in
the shocks for each country and sector between 1997 and 2007.
The first three columns in Table 1.7 summarize the average changes in trade
costs. I report the trade volume weighted trade costs for each country, as well as
the average trade costs in OECD and non-OECD countries. The first observation
is that the reductions in trade costs are larger in non-OECD countries, especially
in the manufacturing sector. It is also interesting to note that there are significant
reductions in the trade costs of the services sector. Given that the services sector
often has the largest production share in each country, especially in the OECD
countries, the effects of trade may be larger than trade models in which services are
regarded as non-tradable.







. Again, productivity growth is much larger in non-
OECD countries, especially in the manufacturing sector. As sectoral productivity
growth is found to be the most important driver of structural change in the literature,
the impacts of structural change on the skill premium is likely to be larger in non-
OECD countries.
For the skill-biased technical change in the next three columns of Table 1.7, we
see that most of the increases in skill intensity happened in the services sector. As
OECD countries have larger production shares in the services sector, the impacts
of skill-biased technical change on the skill premium is likely to be relatively more
important than in non-OECD countries.
Finally, the last column of Table 1.7 shows the changes in the relative supply of
skilled labor. On average, the share of the skilled labor increases, implying downward
pressure on the skill premium.
1.4.5 External Validation
The model replicates the trade shares, production shares, consumption shares,
and skill premium in the data, so I assess the fit of the model by using external data
to verify some of the shocks I back out.
1.4.5.1 Labor Productivity
The first validation exercise tests whether labor productivity in the model
reflects the true values in the data. Figure 1.3 plots labor productivity in the model
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against TFP in the data.23 Labor productivity in each country is a production share
weighted average of sectoral labor productivity. Sectoral labor productivity takes
into account the effect of trade and is calculated as LPkn =
ckn
Pkn
.24 The plots show that
labor productivity in each country correlates well with TFP in both years. Figure
1.4 also shows that the log changes in labor productivity correlates reasonably well
with log changes in TFP.
1.4.5.2 Share of the Skilled Labor
The second exercise verifies the share of the skilled labor Sn
Ln
in each country.
Figure 1.5 plots the model-implied Sn
Ln
against the share of populations with incom-
plete tertiary degree taken from Barro and Lee (2013).25 The fit is reasonable with
R2 over 0.2 for both years, but the model over-estimates the share of the skilled labor
for most countries. Figure 1.6 presents the model-implied changes in Sn
Ln
against the
corresponding changes in the Barro and Lee (2013) measure. The slope is positive
when I take into account the outliers.26
One reason of the coarse fit is that the skilled labor in developed countries
may be of higher quality than their counterparts in developing countries. If this is
the case, the share of the skilled labor I back out also reflects the quality of the
23I compute TFP directly from PWT 8.1 as the TFP valued at current PPPs in the corresponding
years.
24See Finicelli et al. (2013) for detail.
25As data from Barro and Lee (2013) is at 5-year intervals, I compare the model-implied share
in 2007 to the data in 2005, and the model share in 1997 to the data in 1995.
26I drop 7 countries where the deviations from the changes in the data are at least 8 percentage
points.
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labor force.27 To check whether this is the case, Figure 1.7 plots the model-implied
share against the TFP-adjusted data share: TFP × Sn
Ln
(data). There is a large
improvement in the fit, as indicated by an increase in the R2. The changes in the
model-implied share also see a large improvement in the fit from Figure 1.8.
Finally, I regress the model-implied share of the skilled labor on observables,
which help explain cross country differences in educational attainment. Restuccia
and Vandenbroucke (2014) find that variations in TFP and life expectancy explain
most of the differences in educational attainment across countries and over time.
Therefore, I regress the model-implied share on TFP, life expectancy, and the share
of government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP to assess the model
fit. Table 1.8 presents the regression results. The first observation is that for the
model-implied share, all three observables are of the correct sign and the R-squares
are over 0.5 in both years. Moreover, the data measure from Barro and Lee (2013)
does not fit well as the model-implied share, indicating that the model share may
reflect the quality difference of the skilled labor.
In sum, the validation exercises above show that the shocks on the share of
the skilled labor are reasonable.
27Another interpretation is that the same college graduate is more productive in rich countries,
as rich countries have larger capital stock.
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1.4.5.3 Trade Cost
I verify the validity of the bilateral trade cost I back out by regressing it
on common determinants of trade cost.28 The observables include tariffs, log dis-
tance, and the dummy variables such as contiguity (=1 if two countries share the
border), common language (=1 if two countries speak the same official language),
non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements (=1 if two countries have a NRPTA),
reciprocal preferential trade agreements (=1 if two countries have a RPTA), and
trade agreements (=1 if two countries either are in the same currency or economic
union, or in the same free trade agreement).
The left panel of Table 1.9 presents the regression results on levels of trade cost
for each sector in year 1997 and 2007. The first observation is that all the coefficients
on tariffs and distance are of the correct sign and statistically significant, except the
tariff coefficient on agriculture in 2007. Second, all of the coefficients on contiguity
and common language are negative and statistically significant, except the common
language coefficient on services in 2007. In sum, the level of trade cost I back out is
reasonable as it correlates well with the common determinants of trade cost.29
The right panel of Table 1.9 presents the regression results on changes in trade
costs. Log distance is interacted with the changes in world crude oil price so that
the coefficient is identified. The first observation is that the distance coefficient is
28As almost all country pairs in my sample have bilateral trade flows, there is no problem of
zero trade flows.
29The exception is that some of the coefficients on the TA dummy imply higher trade costs. These
may reflect an endogeneity bias since TAs are correlated with bilateral unobserved characteristics
(e.g., Limão (2016)), which I can’t control for in levels.
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of the correct sign and statistically significant. The fit is particularly good for the
changes in trade costs in the services sector, with all coefficients of the correct sign
and a large R2. In sum, the changes in trade costs are also reasonable.
1.4.6 Classifying Shocks
In this section I classify shocks Ψ into trade shocks, technology shocks, labor
supply shocks, and model residuals.
For a home country n, any shocks outside country n affect the home country
through trade only. These shocks include the trade cost shocks {κ̂kmi, τ̂ kmi}, shocks
to trade deficits D̂n, and shocks to foreign sectoral production efficiency T̂
k
−n, which
corresponds to the definition of foreign shocks in Arkolakis et al. (2012).30 The
technology shocks at home include shocks to home production efficiency T̂ kn as well as
skill-biased technical change ∆βkn. The shocks to home sectoral production efficiency
T̂ kn can be regarded as neutral technical change (NTC). I classify the shocks as
follows:
1. Trade shocks consist of
• trade cost shocks: {κ̂kmi, τ̂ kmi},
• trade deficits shocks: ∆Dn,
• foreign technology shocks: T̂ k−n;
2. Technology shocks consist of:
30I focus on shocks that affect trade directly to study the first order effect. Other shocks, such
as skill-biased technical change ∆βk−n, affect trade flows indirectly through their effects on the unit
cost ckn.
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• skill-biased technical change: ∆βkn,
• neutral technical change: T̂ kn ;
3. Labor supply shocks: {L̂n, Ŝn, Ûn};
4. Model residuals consist of the changes in:
• value added share: ∆vkn,
• preference shifters: ∆akn,
• input shifters: ∆gkln .
1.5 Counterfactuals
With the shocks that fully account for the changes that occurred from 1997 to
2007, I can provide insight on whether it is trade or technical change that drives the
changes in the skill premium in each country. To do so I consider a scenario where
only one set of shocks is operative, keeping other types of shocks fixed at their 1997
levels, and apply each set of shocks country by country to see the effects on the skill
premium.
Table 1.10 summarizes my main findings. It shows the effects of shocks from
the labor supply, trade, technology, and residuals on changes in the skill premium,
with each group of shocks acting in isolation.3132 The first three rows present the
31All changes in the skill premium are relative changes: ∆SP% = SP(c)−SP(97)SP(97) × 100%, where
SP(c) is the skill premium at the counterfactual.
32There is no reason for the effects of each shock to add up to the observed value because there
are interactions between different shocks.
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median values across the respective group of countries. In general, both trade and
technical change increase the skill premium, while labor supply shocks decrease it.
The results for each individual country reveal that trade increases the skill pre-
mium in all countries, with a median of 8.3%. In particular, small countries, such as
Ireland and Luxembourg, or countries experiencing large reductions in trade costs,
such as China, have larger effects of trade on the skill premium. In general, trade
increases the skill premium more in non-OECD countries than in OECD countries.
The effects of technical change on the skill premium are more heterogeneous. For
some countries, such as China and India, technical change increases the skill pre-
mium by over 20%, while for some other countries, such as Peru, the effects are
negative and large. The heterogeneity can be explained by the average changes in
skill intensity for each country, as shown in the left panel of Figure 1.9. This sug-
gests that SBTC plays a major role in explaining the changes in skill premium due
to technical change.
To gauge the relative importance of trade and technical change, I focus on the
subset of countries where both forces increase the skill premium. Trade increases the
skill premium by 7.5%, while technical change increases the skill premium by 5.3%
in a typical country in this subset. The last two columns of Table 1.10 illustrate the
contribution of each channel to the rise in the skill premium.33 In a typical country,
trade and technical change are equally important.
It is interesting to note that for Latin American countries and some Asian
33The contribution from trade, for example, is computed as ∆SP(trade)∆SP(trade)+∆SP(tech) × 100%.
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emerging economies, the residuals are particularly large, indicating that a lot of
the observed changes in the skill premium are due to neither trade nor technical
change. To investigate whether the large residuals are due to changes in the value
added share ∆vkn for k ∈ Ω, the right panel of Figure 1.9 plots the changes in the skill
premium due to shocks to value added share against the skill premium predicted
by residuals.34 The shocks to value added share help explain the effects from the
residuals, but a significant portion remains unexplained, especially for the Latin
American countries. This shows that the channels in the model do not capture the
observed changes in household expenditure shares and intermediates expenditure
shares in some countries.35
1.5.1 Trade and Technical Change
As I have different types of trade shocks, it is worthwhile to understand which
type of trade shocks is more important. The first three columns of Table 1.11 present
the effects of the three types of trade shocks on the changes in skill premium. The
main findings are that trade increases the skill premium due to foreign technical
change but not changes in the trade cost or deficits. In general, the effects of trade
cost and trade deficits are small for most of the countries. The effects of foreign
technical change, on the other hand, have a median value of 6.3% on the skill
premium for OECD countries and a larger value of 13% for non-OECD countries.
34I only focus on countries where the effects of the residuals are larger than 5% in absolute
values.
35One reason may be that I do not have other factors of production such as land, which may be
important for exporters of agricultural goods such as Argentina.
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This illustrates the importance of considering foreign technical change, in addition
to changes in the trade cost and deficits, when evaluating the impact of trade on
the skill premium.
The last two columns of Table 1.11 illustrate the effects of NTC and SBTC
on the changes in the skill premium. SBTC explains most of the increases in the
skill premium, which confirms the findings in the left panel of Figure 1.9. On the
other hand, the effects of NTC are mostly negative except for China, where sectoral
productivity growth is exceptional. Moreover, the median effects of SBTC are larger
in OECD countries. This is partially explained by the fact that SBTC are larger in
the services sector in the OECD countries (from Table 1.7), and that rich countries
have a larger production share in services.
1.5.2 Role of Structural Change
In this section, I investigate the effects of structural change on the skill pre-
mium by shutting down the endogenous changes in household expenditure share
(skn) and aggregate intermediates expenditure share (e
k
n).
36 More specifically, both
the consumer utility and intermediates expenditure function are Cobb-Douglas. In
addition, there are no sectoral linkages, so each sector has the same intermediates
expenditure share for all sectors.37 The no structural change model is similar to the
36To be precise, there is still structural change induced by international trade, which is the “net
export channel” as in Uy et al. (2013), due to differences in sectoral production efficiency and
skill abundance across countries. Keeping that in mind, I will call the simple framework the “no
structural change model.”






n for k ∈ Ω.
37
standard multi-sector trade model considered by Caliendo and Parro (2015).
The no structural change model has two additional shocks compared to the
baseline: the household expenditure share skn(t) and aggregate intermediates expen-
diture share ekn(t) for k ∈ Ω. The values of skn(t) are set to the values in the data,
while the values of ekn(t) are equal to the e
k
n(t) in the baseline, which matches the
structural change.38 I match the no structural change model to the same moments
in the baseline so that it yields the same exogenous variables and shocks.39
I apply the same groups of shocks one by one to the no structural change model
and compare the results with the baseline. Table 1.12 decomposes the changes in
skill premium for the no structural change model. Comparing with the baseline
results in Table 1.10, the main observation is that the effects of trade on the skill
premium are almost halved (from 8.3% to 4.2%). Moreover, the effects of technical
change are negligible in non-OECD countries. In terms of percentage contributions,
trade now explains only 35% of the increases in skill premium in a typical country,
compared to 50% in the baseline. From Figure 1.10, where I plot the changes in
skill premium in the no structural change model against the baseline, the effect of
trade is smaller in almost every country.
To quantify the effects of structural change on the skill premium, I add up
the differences implied by the labor supply, trade, and technology shocks between
38The shocks to consumption expenditure share and intermediates expenditure share play the
same roles as preference shifters and input shifters, respectively, in the baseline model. These two
shocks are counted as residuals.
39Shocks to production efficiency are slightly different as sectoral linkages differ, which implies
a different unit cost ckn(t). I compare the production efficiency T
k
n implied by the two models and
find that they are very similar.
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the baseline and no structural change model. The calculation shows that structural
change increases the skill premium by 2.3% in OECD countries and 7.7% in non-
OECD countries.40 This shows that structural change has larger effects on the skill
premium in non-OECD countries.
The effects of structural change come mainly from the shocks to sectoral pro-
duction efficiency T kn , as shown in Table 1.13. Comparing to the baseline results in
Table 1.11, the effects of foreign technical change decrease a lot. The reason is that
sectoral technical change is the main driver of structural change in the model. Other
types of shocks that have little effect on structural change, such as labor supply and
SBTC, give similar results as the baseline.41
The finding that structural change has a larger effect in non-OECD countries
is also shown in Figure 1.11, where I plot the differences in the skill premium implied
by the baseline and no structural change model against income per worker in each
country. Both graphs for trade and technology shocks give a negative slope, indicat-
ing that the effect of structural change is larger for non-OECD countries. This may
be due to the fact that non-OECD countries have larger increases in sectoral produc-
tion efficiency than do OECD countries, as shown in Table 1.7. Sectoral technical
change drives structural change, leading to larger increases in the skill premium in
non-OECD countries.
40An alternative is to calculate the increases in the effects of the residuals. This gives an increase
of 1.7% in OECD countries and 7.4% in non-OECD countries.
41See Appendix A.4 for details on contributions of different shocks to structural change.
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1.5.3 Robustness
In this section, I check whether my main results are sensitive to alternative
values of trade elasticity and separate estimation of expenditure functions for OECD
and non-OECD countries. In all the exercises, I recalibrate the parameters and back
out the shocks so that the model with alternative specifications match the same data
as the baseline.
1.5.3.1 Trade Elasticity
The upper part of Table 1.14 presents the results under θ = 3 and θ = 5.
Comparing with the baseline, we see that the results under alternative values of trade
elasticity imply different effects of trade and technical change on the skill premium.
Moreover, the results on non-OECD countries are more sensitive to different values
of trade elasticity. The reason that why my results are sensitive to the values of trade
elasticity is that it affects the values of the shocks I back out. In particular, I back
out sectoral prices conditional on the value of trade elasticity from the estimation
of (1.16), and shocks to sectoral production efficiency and trade cost depend on
sectoral prices.
To gauge whether the value of trade elasticity of θ = 4 is reasonable, I esti-
mate the elasticities in agriculture and manufacturing, following the triple difference
method used by Caliendo and Parro (2015).42 From (1.7), I multiply the trade flows
from country i to country h, from country h to country n, and finally from country
42The method utilizes variation in tariffs, so it is not applicable to the services sector.
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n to country i, and then divide the trade flows in the opposite directions. The




























and I estimate it by OLS. Table 1.15 presents the estimates for each year of GTAP
data for 37 countries in my sample. We see that the trade elasticity in manufacturing
ranges from 1.5 to 4.5, while the estimates in the agriculture sector are too small.
The reason may be due to the fact that variation in tariffs provide little information
on identifying trade elasticity, as pointed out by Simonovska and Waugh (2014b).
Therefore, I use θ = 4 from Simonovska and Waugh (2014a), which is the standard
value of trade elasticity for models with broad sectors.43
1.5.3.2 Separate Estimation of Expenditure Functions
The bottom part of Table 1.14 shows the results when AIDS and translog
intermediates expenditure functions are estimated separately for OECD and non-
OECD countries. Comparing with the baseline, estimating translog intermediates
expenditure function separately does not have much effect on the results. However,
a separate estimation of AIDS reduces (increases) the effects of technical change on
OECD (non-OECD) countries and reduces the residuals in non-OECD countries.44
Overall, the effects are similar to the baseline results.
43In the future, I plan to use sectoral price data to estimate the trade elasticity consistent with
my framework. As pointed out by Simonovska and Waugh (2014b), different trade models imply
different sectoral prices conditional on the same trade flows, so different model-consistent trade
elasticities can be identified from variation in sectoral prices.
44The residuals for Latin American countries are still very large.
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1.6 Structural Change in the U.S. and China
In this section, I apply the framework to investigate the effects of trade and
technical change on structural change in the U.S. and China. The motivation comes
from the fact that since 2001, the U.S. has experienced a huge increase in manu-
facturing imports from China.45 The influx of cheap Chinese goods has profound
influences on the U.S. labor markets, such as a declining manufacturing employment
share in trade-exposed regions and larger earning losses for unskilled manufacturing
workers.46 Meanwhile, China is able to transform from an agricultural economy to
a world manufacturing factory through its export-oriented growth strategy.47
There is a growing body of literature analyzing the effects of imports from
China on the U.S. labor markets, both at the levels of industry and local labor
markets. Autor et al. (2013) find that there is a larger decline in employment in
commuting zones that are more exposed to imports from China. At the industry
level, Acemoglu et al. (2016) find that manufacturing industries that face greater
import penetration from China face larger employment losses.
Based on my structural model, I can investigate the effects of imports from
China on the U.S. labor market at the sector level, using the trade shocks that I
back out. Though I do not have industry and local labor market variation, one
advantage of my approach is that it does not suffer from the potential endogeneity
45See, for example, Handley and Limão (2013).
46See, for example, Autor et al. (2013, 2014) and others.
47See, for example, Brandt et al. (2008) on structural transformation in China.
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problem of the instrument used in these papers.48 In addition, the structural model
incorporates the general equilibrium effects of trade shocks from China, which are
in general hard to estimate using a reduced form approach.
My framework can also shed light on whether it is trade or technical change
that is driving the changes in the U.S. labor markets. Autor et al. (2015) uses ex-
posure to computerization as technology shock, together with imports from China
as trade shock, to investigate the effects of trade and technical change on the em-
ployment at the commuting zone level. Given that I have different types of trade
and technology shocks that are independent, I can separately identify the effects of
each shock on the U.S. economy.
1.6.1 Shocks
I use the baseline specification to focus on the effects of shocks that involve
only the U.S. and China. These shocks include T̂ kn , ∆β
k
n, ∆Dn, and {L̂n, Ŝn, Ûn}
in the U.S. and China, as well as trade cost shocks {κ̂kni, τ̂ kni} involving only the
U.S.–China pair. Shocks for other countries are kept at 1997 values.
Suppose the U.S. is the home country. Shocks on the trade deficits in the U.S.
reflect only the effects of trade with China, which is given by:
∆DUS = ∆XUS CHN −∆XCHN US.
48These papers often instrument imports from China in the U.S. by imports from China in other
high-income countries in order to correct for factors affecting imports originated in the U.S. The
instruments are invalid if shocks in the home country that affect imports from China correlate
across high-income countries. To the extent that the patterns of structural change are similar
across high-income countries, the identifying assumption of the instrument is likely to fail.
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From the perspective of the U.S., foreign technical change refers only to changes in
the production efficiency in China, T̂ kCHN. This implies that the trade shocks for the
U.S. in the counterfactual are:
1. trade cost shock: {κ̂kCHN US, τ̂ kCHN US},
2. trade deficits shock: ∆DUS,
3. changes in production efficiency in China: T̂ kCHN.
A similar set of trade shocks can be grouped for China. The technology and labor
supply shocks are the same as the counterfactuals on the skill premium.
1.6.2 Counterfactuals
I first compare the effects of trade between the U.S. and China on the skill
premium to the effects of trade between all countries (baseline) in Table 1.16. We see
that U.S.–China trade has larger effects on the skill premium in China, contributing
to 34% of the rise in skill premium due to trade. For the U.S., the contribution
is smaller at 13%. The reason for this finding is that the U.S. is a very important
trading partner for China during the period, while the U.S. trades mostly with
developed countries.
In the following, I present the effects of trade and technical change on the
production share and labor reallocations in the U.S. and China.
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1.6.2.1 Sectoral Reallocation
Figure 1.12 shows the effects of trade and technical change on the changes in
production share in the U.S.. The main findings are that trade with China explains
more than half of the decline in the manufacturing share, and NTC explains around
one-third of the decline. Moreover, the main effect of NTC is to reallocate economic
activity from agriculture to the services sector. These results are consistent with
the findings of Autor et al. (2015), who find that trade with China mainly affects
the manufacturing sector, while computerization has wider effects on the whole
economy.
Comparing the left and right panel gives us the general equilibrium effects
from structural change. The negative effects of trade with China are smaller under
the standard model. The effects of NTC are mainly due to structural change, which
is important in explaining the expansion of the services sector. Moreover, NTC
decreases the manufacturing share through structural change, as the effects of NTC
are opposite in sign under the standard model.
In the case of China, Figure 1.13 illustrates that the effect of trade with the
U.S. and NTC is to shift resources from the agriculture to the manufacturing sector.
From Table 1.17, Trade and technical change together completely explain the rise
in the manufacturing share. This is consistent with the experience in China that
a lot of resources are shifting from agriculture-based rural villages to industrialized
city coasts. Similar to the case of the U.S., most of the effects of NTC on sectoral
reallocation come from structural change.
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1.6.2.2 Labor Reallocation
In the following, I investigate the differential effects of trade and technical
change across the skilled and unskilled workers, through the angle of labor realloca-
tion across sectors.
Figure 1.14 presents the effects of trade and technical change on the sectoral
employment share in the U.S. From the left panel, the skilled worker switches out
of the manufacturing into the services sector. The contributions from trade with
China, NTC, and SBTC are similar in magnitude. For the reallocation of the
unskilled worker, the effects of trade and NTC are similar as in the case of the
skilled worker, but the effects of SBTC are opposite. The reason for this is that
most SBTC occurs in the services sector in the U.S., as can be seen from Table
1.7. From Table 1.18, the net effect of trade with China and technical change
is to reduce the manufacturing employment share of skilled workers by 1.6%, but
only 0.2% for the unskilled workers. This is consistent with the findings of Autor
et al. (2014) that workers with low qualifications are more likely to remain in trade-
exposed manufacturing sector and subject to further trade shocks. Moreover, NTC
has wider impacts than trade in that some unskilled workers from agriculture switch
out to services.
The above results suggest that the distributional impacts on workers with
different skills come mainly from SBTC but not NTC. As computerization has both
the neutral and skill-biased components of technical change, the results from Autor
et al. (2015) probably capture a mixture of these two types of technical change. In
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particular, the authors find that computerization has no significant impact on the
net manufacturing employment, which can be reconciled from the above findings
that NTC and SBTC has the opposite effect on the manufacturing employment
shares of the skilled and unskilled workers.
In the case of China from Figure 1.15, most of the labor reallocation is char-
acterized by unskilled workers switching out of agriculture to manufacturing, with
a net increase in the manufacturing employment share of the unskilled workers at
6.6%. From Table 1.18, trade with the U.S. increases the manufacturing employment
share of the unskilled by 4.9%, while the effect of NTC is smaller at 3.8%. Relative
to trade with the U.S., NTC induces more unskilled workers in agriculture to move
to services. The skilled workers mainly move out of manufacturing to services, and
most of this pattern is due to skill-biased technical change.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the effects of trade and technical change on the changes in
skill premium in the presence of structural change. I find that trade and technical
change each contributes 50% to the rise in the skill premium from 1997 to 2007.
Moreover, the positive effects of trade on the skill premium come from changes in
foreign production efficiency but not changes in the trade cost.
The key mechanism behind the positive effects of trade on the skill premium
is structural change, driven by endogenous changes in household expenditure and
a firm’s intermediates expenditure. The household side is due to nonhomothetic
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preferences, and the firm side is due to intensive usage of own sector intermediates.
Once structural change is shut down, the effects of trade on the skill premium are
halved. My results therefore highlight a quantitatively important channel by which
foreign productivity growth increases the skill premium at home through reallocation
to skill-intensive sectors and international trade.
My framework also sheds light on the shrinking of the manufacturing sector in
the U.S. The quantitative exercise on the U.S. and China reveals that in the U.S.,
more than half of the decline in the manufacturing production share is attributable
to trade with China. Moreover, 1.6% of the skilled workers have moved out of the
shrinking manufacturing sector, but only 0.2% of the unskilled workers are able to
do so. On the other hand, trade with the U.S. explains most of the rise in the
manufacturing production share in China. Moreover, 6.6% of the unskilled workers
move from agriculture to manufacturing.
My results point to the fact that, to the extent that most of the increases
in the skill premium are driven by technical changes (whether through skill-biased
technical change or foreign productivity growth), inequality is a byproduct of eco-
nomic development. This underlines the importance of designing policies such that
the people with low skill also benefit from technological progress.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Average skill intensity (%)
βk in 1997 ∆βk
A M S A M S
OECD 15.9 30.9 43.9 -0.07 0.05 2.35
Non-OECD 5.66 16.6 38.4 1.65 0.70 0.62
Notes: A=Agriculture, M=Manufacturing, S=Services. ∆x = x(07)−x(97) is simple
difference between the two periods. Skill intensity is measured by share of total wage
payments to the skilled.
Table 1.2: Average consumption expenditure share (%)
sk in 1997 ∆sk
A M S A M S
OECD 14.5 18.9 66.7 -3.16 1.06 2.10
Non-OECD 30.2 22.8 47.0 -8.40 -2.34 10.74
Table 1.3: Average intermediates expenditure share (%)
ekl in 2007 ∆ekl
A M S A M S
Agriculture 56.3 17.5 26.3 -2.10 0.58 1.52
Manufacturing 2.00 71.6 26.4 -1.17 0.77 0.40
Services 5.91 30.1 64.0 0.95 -1.95 1.01
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Table 1.4: Calibrated AIDS parameters
αA αM αM bA bM bS
0.065 0.176 0.759 -0.062 -0.008 0.070
δAA δAM δAS δMM δMS δSS
0.034 0.032 -0.067 -0.059 0.027 0.040












Agriculture 0.059 -0.045 -0.014 0.041 0.004 0.010
Manufacturing -0.029 0.063 -0.035 -0.126 0.063 -0.028
Services -0.083 0.096 -0.013 -0.103 0.007 0.006
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Table 1.6: Structural change: 1997 to 2007 (%)
Production share Consumption share Intermediates share
A M S A M S A M S
OECD -2.9 -1.6 4.5 -3.2 1.1 2.1 -1.4 0.1 1.2
Non-OECD -5.8 1.9 3.9 -8.4 -2.3 10.7 -3.7 0.0 3.7
AUS -2.7 -2.5 5.2 -3.0 0.8 2.1 0.4 -9.0 8.6
AUT -1.0 5.7 -4.7 -2.1 2.4 -0.3 -0.3 11.7 -11.4
BEL -2.6 -1.7 4.3 -0.5 4.2 -3.7 -3.5 0.7 2.8
CAN -2.4 -6.0 8.4 -1.9 -4.2 6.1 -1.4 -3.3 4.7
DEU -0.9 4.9 -4.1 -1.0 3.5 -2.5 -1.0 1.4 -0.5
DNK -3.3 1.2 2.1 -1.1 6.4 -5.3 -2.3 5.1 -2.8
ESP -3.4 -0.3 3.7 -1.2 -3.6 4.8 -3.6 1.5 2.1
FIN -2.4 3.5 -1.1 -3.3 5.9 -2.5 -1.5 9.8 -8.4
FRA -1.3 -2.7 4.0 -2.8 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.9 -2.9
GBR -1.8 -5.0 6.8 -0.2 4.5 -4.3 -1.5 -5.4 6.9
GRC -7.2 -0.5 7.8 -19.6 -3.4 23.0 2.4 21.1 -23.5
IRL -6.5 -5.8 12.3 -0.4 0.7 -0.4 -2.0 -15.4 17.4
ITA -1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.6 4.7 -4.1 -1.0 2.1 -1.1
JPN -1.5 0.0 1.5 -2.0 -2.8 4.8 -0.4 -1.5 1.9
KOR -3.9 1.1 2.8 -10.5 -6.0 16.5 -2.2 1.7 0.6
LUX -7.7 -16.0 23.7 -2.1 0.5 1.6 -9.7 -23.7 33.5
NLD -1.7 -5.0 6.6 1.7 1.9 -3.6 -0.6 -2.8 3.4
PRT -2.3 -1.6 3.9 -10.2 -5.9 16.1 1.9 6.4 -8.3
SWE -2.1 -0.4 2.5 -1.2 10.0 -8.8 -1.2 -1.2 2.4
USA -1.3 -1.6 2.9 -1.2 -0.1 1.3 -0.2 0.8 -0.6
ARG -5.6 -14.3 19.9 -12.4 -11.9 24.4 -6.7 -18.6 25.4
BRA -4.0 -4.4 8.4 -9.0 -9.2 18.1 -3.5 -5.2 8.7
CHL -9.7 4.2 5.5 -11.4 -3.8 15.2 -6.6 -1.3 7.9
CHN -6.9 3.6 3.3 -19.1 -5.7 24.8 -2.8 0.2 2.6
CZE -6.8 6.5 0.3 -8.8 -7.9 16.7 -4.9 5.4 -0.5
HUN -4.3 11.5 -7.2 4.4 -1.1 -3.3 -3.8 11.0 -7.2
IDN -5.4 4.9 0.6 -9.1 1.4 7.7 -3.7 5.0 -1.3
IND -7.3 -1.1 8.4 -10.7 -3.2 13.9 -3.1 0.8 2.3
MEX -6.9 -6.5 13.4 -7.7 -5.8 13.5 -6.4 -8.1 14.5
PER -1.8 11.2 -9.4 1.9 4.7 -6.7 -1.9 3.8 -1.9
PHL -8.3 10.8 -2.5 -15.7 4.0 11.7 -2.0 4.0 -2.0
POL -6.4 2.0 4.4 -9.5 0.5 9.0 -3.9 1.2 2.7
SVK -9.4 0.4 9.0 -11.0 -0.2 11.2 -6.9 -1.6 8.5
SVN -6.9 -1.7 8.6 -11.7 2.6 9.1 -4.1 -2.1 6.1
THA -1.2 8.1 -6.9 -1.8 -5.3 7.0 -0.8 6.3 -5.5
URY -5.9 -1.8 7.6 -12.8 0.3 12.6 -4.1 -1.6 5.7
VEN -1.1 -1.2 2.2 1.4 0.8 -2.3 1.6 1.0 -2.6
Notes: The first two rows present the simple averages for the OECD and non-OECD
countries respectively. OECD and non-OECD countries are separated by a horizontal
line.
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OECD -6.1 -0.2 -5.4 44.6 16.1 4.9 -0.05 -0.62 2.64 1.58
Non-OECD-11.7 -10.3 -7.0 37.8 31.6 7.6 0.68 -0.05 1.73 2.54
AUS -8.9 -7.1 -0.7 46.7 34.3 17.5 0.59 0.36 -1.45 -1.91
AUT -18.9 -4.6 -3.8 41.5 16.3 -1.4 0.10 -0.10 8.52 5.78
BEL -3.7 1.7 -2.8 16.8 -3.4 -14.4 -2.35 0.86 3.82 2.72
CAN -7.4 6.8 -2.4 40.3 23.0 29.1 1.01 0.48 10.66 7.87
DEU -7.1 -4.8 -9.2 53.8 18.2 0.9 -0.33 0.19 1.96 0.29
DNK -6.4 0.7 -18.7 39.3 33.1 13.2 -1.51 -0.01 4.54 2.57
ESP -5.6 0.1 -11.7 52.0 23.9 14.1 -0.49 0.43 -0.59 -0.40
FIN -6.0 1.8 -10.2 43.1 27.8 13.8 -0.90 0.64 3.80 1.55
FRA -0.1 0.3 2.8 39.1 7.7 -5.4 -0.40 -0.41 5.54 7.19
GBR -3.3 3.8 -10.2 60.0 36.3 13.3 0.43 0.01 1.20 4.54
GRC -5.0 -7.4 -22.6 80.9 40.6 11.6 3.89 -1.18 1.52 4.45
IRL -5.3 -1.0 -28.5 49.4 33.8 27.6 -0.11 2.18 -2.90 -0.35
ITA -3.0 -0.5 -0.5 37.1 16.4 -9.9 1.49 0.21 2.10 -2.96
JPN -0.6 -4.0 5.3 28.8 2.7 -14.2 0.26 0.70 -0.28 0.12
KOR 3.4 -5.7 -6.9 35.2 24.1 21.8 0.83 0.75 1.09 2.22
LUX -25.4 -10.0 -47.2 13.9 47.9 16.4 -3.99 -0.83 0.14 -4.82
NLD 0.9 13.6 -1.7 39.4 28.0 2.8 1.02 -1.84 5.10 3.05
PRT -9.1 1.8 -8.9 51.3 30.9 21.4 -2.40 -0.22 -1.71 -2.18
SWE -12.7 1.1 -12.0 49.8 8.4 -1.1 1.00 -0.96 1.29 2.72
USA -7.7 -0.2 1.3 44.2 24.8 13.8 0.51 -0.23 2.64 1.08
ARG -13.1 -19.8 -5.4 27.4 2.1 -16.2 -0.32 0.93 1.93 4.40
BRA -4.4 -12.3 -5.6 42.9 26.0 4.2 1.66 0.07 -1.26 -0.85
CHL -13.5 -15.6 -1.8 44.5 39.1 8.3 1.47 -0.10 -0.17 2.86
CHN -9.9 -11.0 -12.6 90.9 42.4 18.4 0.55 0.15 5.62 2.07
CZE -20.9 -9.0 -3.6 31.0 28.2 20.3 1.75 1.75 -2.46 -1.53
HUN -11.0 -4.5 -13.1 51.5 44.5 27.9 2.04 1.53 3.54 -0.57
IDN -15.0 -1.9 12.9 39.0 33.2 1.7 1.13 0.50 -4.46 -0.48
IND -17.4 -18.7 -22.7 123.6 39.0 7.6 2.51 -0.06 5.36 5.26
MEX -14.7 0.2 3.4 61.5 29.3 37.4 4.27 0.68 3.33 2.75
PER -3.6 -14.5 0.6 38.5 23.5 2.5 3.42 -0.13 -10.23 -5.51
PHL -3.1 1.3 45.3 36.5 17.2 -8.0 1.30 3.32 -6.08 -1.86
POL -19.6 -12.8 -9.2 67.7 48.4 24.8 0.85 1.12 4.64 4.27
SVK -23.7 -6.3 -11.0 37.3 33.0 32.6 1.31 1.08 0.59 3.06
SVN -16.0 -7.4 -12.8 33.3 31.2 11.5 1.39 1.36 -2.71 0.63
THA -7.6 -6.1 -3.3 47.9 22.6 -17.3 1.66 0.99 0.09 -0.58
URY 0.3 -8.5 9.0 43.8 25.8 -14.9 1.32 -0.67 10.44 6.82
VEN 7.2 -3.1 19.1 59.5 47.2 21.1 1.77 -0.64 2.30 6.43
Notes: The weights to compute the average changes in trade costs, sectoral technol-
ogy, skill biased technology and share of the skilled labor are trade volumes, sectoral
output, sectoral output and total employment respectively.
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model data model data
TFP 15.14* 29.08* 15.60* 16.06
(2.19) (2.25) (2.06) (1.46)
Life expectancy 0.173 -0.0228 0.194 0.182
(0.52) (-0.04) (0.55) (0.35)
Education expenditure
GDP
1.570 -1.472 1.253 0.446
(1.62) (-0.81) (1.81) (0.44)
N 33 33 35 35
R2 0.543 0.271 0.507 0.265
Notes: t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The model
column uses the model implied SnLn as the dependend variable, while the data column
uses the share of incomplete teriary from Barro and Lee (2013).
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Table 1.9: Validation on the trade cost
2007 1997 Change










ni ∆ ln d
A
ni ∆ ln d
M







0.113 1.743*** 0.201** 0.961*** 0.036 -0.004
(1.00) (5.43) (2.69) (4.61) (0.57) (-0.06)
distance 0.320*** 0.286*** 0.079*** 0.257*** 0.230*** 0.008* 0.036*** 0.013* 0.065***
(27.90) (29.39) (12.86) (22.40) (24.55) (2.29) (6.18) (2.46) (15.86)
contig -0.128*** -0.028 -0.208*** -0.158*** -0.109*** -0.032**
(-3.60) (-0.92) (-10.60) (-4.91) (-3.93) (-3.18)
comlang -0.113*** -0.108*** 0.011 -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.023**
(-4.10) (-4.67) (0.72) (-4.12) (-4.71) (-2.93)
NRPTA -0.024 0.053* -0.072*** -0.086*** -0.034 -0.004 -0.041 -0.022 -0.021
(-0.76) (2.01) (-4.20) (-3.48) (-1.60) (-0.48) (-1.53) (-0.92) (-1.11)
RPTA 0.071 0.035 -0.036 0.069 0.076 -0.028 -0.027 0.025 -0.175***
(1.10) (0.65) (-1.02) (1.46) (1.86) (-1.87) (-0.73) (0.77) (-6.81)
TA 0.015 0.068** 0.050*** -0.033 -0.190*** -0.010 0.095*** 0.022 -0.011
(0.62) (3.24) (3.68) (-1.09) (-7.82) (-1.19) (4.41) (1.15) (-0.74)
N 1322 1332 1332 1324 1330 1330 1317 1330 1330
R2 0.797 0.799 0.836 0.801 0.839 0.931 0.356 0.310 0.697
Notes: t statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The
independent variable, from top to bottom, reads log tariff, log distance, common
border, common language, non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement, reciprocal
PTA, and trade agreement capturing currency union, economic union, and free trade
agreement. All regressions with exporter and importer fixed effects. There are a total
of 37 countries, so that the total number of bilateral pairs is 1332. Data on distance
and the dummy variables comes from Limão (2016). For the specification on changes
in the trade cost, log distance is interacted with changes in the crude oil price.
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All 2.30 -10.72 8.31 1.74 0.30
All(tech>0) 2.30 -16.63 7.45 5.31 1.07 49.9% 50.1%
OECD 2.45 -8.78 7.31 2.29 -0.25
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.48 10.57 1.74 3.33
AUS 6.48 9.01 5.62 -5.11 -1.52
AUT -1.45 -24.13 4.91 20.77 0.24 19.1% 80.9%
BEL 2.30 -11.52 8.27 5.31 -0.63 60.9% 39.1%
CAN 0.27 -34.24 2.82 43.52 0.30 6.1% 93.9%
DEU 4.91 -1.57 4.06 3.63 0.13 52.8% 47.2%
DNK 2.60 -10.72 8.45 8.48 -2.41 49.9% 50.1%
ESP 4.08 1.81 10.89 -5.15 -0.73
FIN 4.52 -6.84 7.45 9.95 -3.65 42.8% 57.2%
FRA -11.91 -28.79 7.02 11.67 2.23 37.6% 62.4%
GBR -14.46 -19.38 6.92 1.36 -0.85 83.6% 16.4%
GRC -4.65 -18.73 23.44 1.39 1.07 94.4% 5.6%
IRL 1.29 2.54 13.10 -11.06 0.35
ITA 14.91 13.73 7.29 1.20 -5.71 85.9% 14.1%
JPN -0.30 -0.60 1.16 -1.06 0.98
KOR -2.84 -12.12 4.95 5.16 3.00 49.0% 51.0%
LUX 34.20 24.42 17.03 -8.40 -3.66
NLD 5.01 -13.01 9.27 3.19 2.24 74.4% 25.6%
PRT 5.82 12.28 9.12 -7.43 -2.81
SWE -6.08 -11.19 7.32 0.75 0.20 90.7% 9.3%
USA 4.82 -5.14 2.01 9.62 -1.01 17.3% 82.7%
ARG -0.64 -25.97 4.25 1.74 29.03 71.0% 29.0%
BRA 12.83 6.24 3.13 -4.52 9.87
CHL -10.82 -20.45 6.80 -4.67 14.79
CHN 20.92 -14.48 20.28 24.64 1.15 45.1% 54.9%
CZE 2.72 10.07 7.71 -9.27 -6.98
HUN 8.73 3.68 13.46 4.10 -14.69 76.7% 23.3%
IDN -6.22 3.00 11.49 -11.21 -6.14
IND 10.52 -33.60 8.31 24.65 27.97 25.2% 74.8%
MEX 8.26 -18.22 9.38 16.51 10.24 36.2% 63.8%
PER -10.24 42.85 10.57 -26.78 -25.17
PHL -2.97 8.62 29.11 -30.70 3.33
POL -2.31 -20.35 19.39 8.28 4.14 70.1% 29.9%
SVK -2.47 -16.63 9.01 3.92 1.39 69.7% 30.3%
SVN -3.93 -4.23 13.63 -10.60 -1.22
THA 4.58 2.85 18.29 -21.24 8.34
URY 6.05 -38.22 12.23 15.57 23.55 44.0% 56.0%
VEN -24.30 -33.34 3.46 5.21 1.93 39.9% 60.1%
Notes: The second row presents the median values for the subset of countries where
technical change increases the skill premium. The last two columns compute the
contributions from trade and technical change to the increase in skill premium for
countries where the effects of both are positive.
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Table 1.11: Effects of trade and technical change on the skill premium (%): baseline
Trade costs Deficits Foreign tech NTC SBTC
All -0.25 0.07 8.03 -3.82 5.85
OECD -0.10 0.28 6.31 -2.98 5.91
Non-OECD -1.40 -0.38 13.02 -4.79 4.07
AUS -1.01 0.13 6.07 -1.07 -4.24
AUT 0.28 -0.55 5.48 -4.24 29.57
BEL -0.34 1.07 7.40 -4.91 12.22
CAN -0.34 0.07 2.83 -0.26 43.23
DEU -0.38 -0.60 4.59 -2.03 5.97
DNK -0.91 0.66 7.25 -4.10 14.44
ESP 0.20 1.87 8.18 -3.52 -1.63
FIN -0.52 0.97 5.96 -1.75 12.33
FRA -0.08 0.87 6.54 -4.13 17.35
GBR 0.14 0.74 5.53 -2.26 3.87
GRC 3.66 0.95 14.41 -4.22 5.85
IRL -1.74 -7.12 10.86 -6.29 -5.31
ITA -0.13 0.63 6.79 -5.45 7.31
JPN 0.04 0.07 1.11 -0.68 -0.40
KOR -0.17 -0.12 5.29 0.37 4.82
LUX 4.95 1.59 10.70 -6.74 -1.99
NLD 0.16 -0.42 8.04 -8.65 15.29
PRT 0.27 -0.15 8.03 -1.95 -5.64
SWE 0.29 0.24 5.38 -2.45 3.19
USA -0.12 0.33 1.66 0.47 9.02
ARG -2.32 -1.01 5.24 -3.82 6.31
BRA -0.25 -1.06 4.05 -1.29 -3.43
CHL -1.44 -3.98 11.57 -5.30 0.56
CHN 3.18 2.81 10.04 7.10 16.45
CZE -5.70 0.13 17.06 -6.71 -3.51
HUN -1.40 -1.59 15.17 -8.30 13.96
IDN -1.40 0.56 12.09 -0.62 -11.92
IND -1.82 -1.09 6.80 -0.21 25.72
MEX 0.66 -0.33 9.91 1.14 15.23
PER -0.73 -2.09 13.02 -4.79 -24.42
PHL -3.90 8.16 32.18 -23.03 -13.30
POL 1.08 -0.03 16.42 -5.75 15.55
SVK -4.76 -0.60 17.67 -0.10 4.07
SVN -2.48 1.15 14.87 -7.07 -4.77
THA 0.56 -1.22 17.02 -24.51 2.55
URY -2.83 0.32 14.33 -12.35 39.13
VEN 0.63 -0.38 6.28 -1.69 7.86
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All 2.30 -10.71 4.24 3.07 3.04
All(tech>0) 2.30 -16.79 3.96 6.92 3.30 34.7% 65.3%
OECD 2.45 -8.77 4.00 3.27 1.42
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.58 4.52 0.24 10.71
AUS 6.48 9.09 2.28 -5.84 2.29
AUT -1.45 -24.16 3.40 23.24 0.48 12.8% 87.2%
BEL 2.30 -11.52 5.58 6.38 1.02 46.7% 53.3%
CAN 0.27 -34.25 1.39 42.55 2.00 3.2% 96.8%
DEU 4.91 -1.53 2.04 3.89 1.13 34.4% 65.6%
DNK 2.60 -10.71 5.40 10.14 -0.21 34.7% 65.3%
ESP 4.08 1.91 6.61 -4.42 3.04
FIN 4.52 -6.83 3.96 10.17 -0.87 28.0% 72.0%
FRA -11.91 -28.84 3.79 13.37 3.30 22.1% 77.9%
GBR -14.46 -19.39 4.04 1.33 1.70 75.2% 24.8%
GRC -4.65 -18.69 14.03 0.76 8.19 94.9% 5.1%
IRL 1.29 2.37 7.63 -8.75 4.58
ITA 14.91 13.84 3.94 3.07 -5.15 56.2% 43.8%
JPN -0.30 -0.62 0.49 -0.62 0.78
KOR -2.84 -12.13 2.21 3.46 5.81 39.0% 61.0%
LUX 34.20 24.85 13.41 -7.35 2.87
NLD 5.01 -13.05 5.60 7.95 3.31 41.3% 58.7%
PRT 5.82 12.39 5.13 -8.16 0.10
SWE -6.08 -11.19 4.24 1.45 1.14 74.4% 25.6%
USA 4.82 -5.13 0.90 8.44 0.81 9.6% 90.4%
ARG -0.64 -25.93 0.64 3.58 28.22 15.1% 84.9%
BRA 12.83 6.30 1.03 -5.35 12.24
CHL -10.82 -20.50 1.01 -4.36 17.49
CHN 20.92 -14.58 10.04 13.61 19.71 42.4% 57.6%
CZE 2.72 10.59 4.89 -9.36 -1.15
HUN 8.73 3.91 8.59 5.34 -5.73 61.7% 38.3%
IDN -6.22 3.10 4.42 -13.99 2.34
IND 10.52 -33.69 1.30 21.51 35.61 5.7% 94.3%
MEX 8.26 -18.27 3.57 13.22 15.54 21.2% 78.8%
PER -10.24 43.63 3.33 -27.13 -20.59
PHL -2.97 9.58 12.92 -24.68 7.36
POL -2.31 -20.62 10.65 6.92 10.71 60.6% 39.4%
SVK -2.47 -16.79 5.15 0.24 13.06 95.6% 4.4%
SVN -3.93 -4.20 8.23 -9.77 6.46
THA 4.58 3.00 9.90 -11.32 7.77
URY 6.05 -38.28 4.52 23.70 21.73 16.0% 84.0%
VEN -24.30 -33.39 1.21 4.29 5.86 22.0% 78.0%
Notes: the subset of countries where technical change increases the skill premium are
the same as the baseline.
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Table 1.13: Effects of trade and technical change on the skill premium (%): no structural
change
Trade costs Deficits Foreign tech NTC SBTC
All -0.16 0.02 4.44 -3.10 5.98
OECD -0.06 0.14 3.46 -2.78 6.00
Non-OECD -0.70 -0.29 5.32 -3.92 4.06
AUS -0.77 0.07 2.90 -1.79 -4.27
AUT 0.32 -0.22 3.37 -3.07 30.15
BEL -0.21 0.76 4.92 -4.40 12.43
CAN -0.15 0.01 1.40 -0.68 43.80
DEU -0.31 -0.37 2.41 -1.81 6.01
DNK -0.76 0.42 4.27 -3.16 14.72
ESP 0.14 1.08 4.44 -2.85 -1.64
FIN -0.38 0.55 3.11 -1.77 12.49
FRA -0.05 0.47 3.55 -2.91 17.56
GBR 0.06 0.46 3.06 -2.34 3.91
GRC 2.84 0.12 7.78 -4.88 5.98
IRL -2.20 -5.24 6.38 -3.47 -5.41
ITA -0.08 0.35 3.65 -3.76 7.32
JPN 0.01 0.02 0.50 -0.27 -0.39
KOR -0.19 -0.04 2.49 -1.29 4.84
LUX 2.54 1.01 7.21 -5.55 -1.70
NLD 0.17 -0.27 5.11 -5.47 15.64
PRT 0.09 -0.13 4.56 -2.71 -5.69
SWE 0.09 0.15 2.94 -1.71 3.25
USA -0.08 0.17 0.75 -0.42 9.01
ARG -1.66 -0.65 2.51 -2.41 6.36
BRA -0.16 -0.65 1.90 -2.16 -3.41
CHL -1.07 -2.63 5.32 -4.89 0.47
CHN 1.26 1.76 4.48 -2.36 16.63
CZE -2.68 0.26 9.36 -6.32 -3.99
HUN -0.60 -0.97 8.41 -7.50 14.22
IDN -0.70 0.50 5.07 -3.02 -12.28
IND -1.94 -1.29 2.96 -3.19 25.91
MEX 0.01 -0.29 4.16 -1.70 15.03
PER -0.56 -1.04 5.31 -3.92 -24.96
PHL -0.76 5.01 14.24 -13.87 -14.36
POL 0.88 -0.02 7.87 -7.22 15.88
SVK -2.67 -0.27 9.49 -3.76 4.06
SVN -1.39 0.77 8.28 -5.68 -5.05
THA 0.30 -0.68 8.66 -14.09 2.38
URY -2.42 0.40 7.36 -8.54 40.24
VEN 0.56 -0.30 2.68 -3.10 7.92
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All 2.30 -10.72 8.31 1.74 0.30
OECD 2.45 -8.78 7.31 2.29 -0.25
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.48 10.57 1.74 3.33
θ = 3
All 2.30 -10.73 6.07 3.87 0.10
OECD 2.45 -8.78 5.62 4.19 -0.70
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.52 7.24 3.87 2.93
θ = 5
All 2.30 -10.72 10.87 -0.71 0.24
OECD 2.45 -8.78 8.95 -0.60 -0.30
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.45 14.61 -0.71 3.96
Different intermediates expenditure
All 2.30 -10.72 8.73 2.36 0.42
OECD 2.45 -8.78 7.32 1.70 0.06
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.49 11.00 2.69 3.51
Different AIDS
All 2.30 -10.70 7.92 1.84 1.28
OECD 2.45 -8.76 6.67 0.75 1.25
Non-OECD -0.64 -14.56 10.64 4.38 1.28
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Table 1.15: Estimates of trade elasticity: triple difference
pool 2007 2004 2001 1997
Agriculture 0.09 0.03 -0.27 -0.34 0.99
s.e. (0.02) (0.06) (-0.05) (-0.04) (0.05)
Manufacturing 2.81 2.93 4.48 3.59 1.48
s.e. (0.07) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.10)
Notes: The table presents the estimates of trade elasticity (negative value of the coef-
ficients in front of −θk) in agriculture and manufacturing, using the triple difference
method as in Caliendo and Parro (2015). The first column presents the estimates
when pooling four years of data together.






CHN 6.83 7.10 16.45 -14.61 20.28 33.7%
USA 0.27 0.47 9.02 -5.15 2.01 13.4%
Notes: The last column computes the contribution from the trade between the U.S.
and China to the total increase in the skill premium due to trade in these two coun-
tries.








A -1.30 -0.98 -0.20 -0.83 -0.07 0.04
M -1.59 -1.06 -0.98 -0.57 0.21 0.04
S 2.90 2.04 1.18 1.40 -0.14 -0.08
China
A -6.91 -5.18 -4.49 -4.05 0.06 0.01
M 3.60 4.62 4.42 3.28 0.13 -0.08
S 3.32 0.56 0.07 0.77 -0.19 0.07
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Skilled -1.63 -0.70 -0.51 -0.68 0.03
Unskilled -0.22 -0.79 -0.53 0.90 0.03
China
Skilled -1.29 1.82 0.96 -2.67 -0.07
Unskilled 6.57 4.93 3.81 1.12 -0.07
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9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5
log real gdp per worker (%)
Skill Premium
Notes: The skill premium is defined as the ratio of wage payments to a college
educated worker relative to a non-college educated worker. Source: EU KLEMS,
SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), see Appendix A.2 for details on how I
compute the skill premium.
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changes in production share (%)
R2=0.560
Services
Notes: The upper panels plot the changes in the consumption expenditure share
against the changes in production share in each sector. The bottom panels plot
the changes in the average intermediates expenditure share against the changes in
production share in each sector.
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R2=0.287
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−20 0 20 40
predicted change from residuals (%)
45 degree line country
Value added
Notes: The left panel plots the skill premium due to technical change against the
average changes in the skill intensity, which is weighted by the production shares in
1997. The right panel plots the skill premium due to changes in value added share
against that of the model residuals.
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log real gdp per worker
fitted line country
Foreign tech
Notes: The upper panels plot the differences in the skill premium between the baseline
and standard model implied by technology shocks, against the log real income per
worker in 2007. The lower panels plot the differences implied by trade shocks.
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Chapter 2: Intermediates Specialization and Gains from Trade
2.1 Introduction
The extensive trade liberalization in the last two decades has been character-
ized by a large increase in trade in intermediate inputs.1 A related but less explored
fact is the rise in intermediates cost share in production, which we document in
Figure 2.1. This share increased from 49.2% to 55.5% worldwide for manufactur-
ing between 1997 and 2007. Figure 2.1 also reveals that the imported intermedi-
ates share—defined as the ratio of expenditures on imported intermediates to total
intermediates—has increased worldwide from 21.5% to 24.7%. These facts suggest
that international trade may play a role in the growth in intermediates production
share.
It is well known that international trade increases the benefits to production
specialization. In standard models this specialization occurs as production is re-
allocated across firms with fixed technologies to explore economies of scale and
comparative advantage. In this paper, we examine the impact of international trade
on welfare and the production structure when heterogeneous firms can adopt more
1See for example Johnson and Noguera (2012, 2016).
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intermediates production share imported intermediates share
1997
2007
Source: Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) v5 and v8.
Notes: The figure plots the average intermediates production and imported inter-
mediates share in manufacturing across countries in the GTAP (a total of 67). The
weights are total production costs for intermediates production share and total in-
termediates expenditure for imported intermediates share.
specialized technologies so that there is specialization within a firm. To this end,
we first develop a theoretical framework where reductions in trade costs increase
the average intermediates production share in the economy. Second, we study the
implications of our framework on trade share of intermediates and the welfare gains
from trade.
Our framework builds on the heterogeneous firm trade model à la Melitz
(2003). Firms choose between two types of production technology, one utilizes
only primary factors such as labor, and the other utilizes both primary factors and
intermediate inputs sourced from other firms. We assume that the intermediates
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technology has lower unit cost but requires the firm to pay a higher fixed cost.2 3
Therefore only firms that are productive enough use intermediates in production.4
The key feature of our framework is that the productivity advantage of using
intermediates, henceforth the specialization premium, is endogenous to the available
intermediate inputs in the economy via the love of variety setup. Reductions in trade
costs bring in new imported intermediates, which lowers the price of intermediates
in the economy. All else equal, this increases the specialization premium so that
more firms find it profitable to use intermediates. Moreover, overall demand for
intermediates increases in the economy both because there is an increase in the
fraction of adopters and the most productive firms that already upgraded expands.
This further induces more firms to adopt the intermediates technology so that the
average intermediates’ production share in the economy increases.
Therefore, a reduction in trade cost generates an increase in the trade share
of intermediates relative to final consumption goods because the intermediates pro-
duction share rises. Thus, welfare gains from trade are larger relative to a model in
which the unit cost saving from the advanced technology is fixed.
In addition, the flexibility of our framework allows us to look at the effects
2This is similar to models with technology upgrading where firms pay a fixed cost to use a lower
unit cost technology.
3There are two reasons why the unit cost of the intermediates technology is lower. First,
firms can source cheaper imported intermediate inputs. Second, utilizing imported intermediates
increases firm productivity, as documented by Amiti and Konings (2007) for Indonesia, and Halpern
et al. (2015) for Hungary.
4One interpretation of this technology is that the less productive firms must use their primary
input for all tasks (for e.g., producing their own intermediates and assembling them), whereas the
more productive ones can afford a technology that uses more efficient purchased intermediates so
that its primary input can specialize in certain tasks (e.g. assembly).
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of trade liberalization on non-exporters. To do so we focus on the case where all
exporters already use intermediates so that trade costs can affect the technology
decisions of purely domestic firms.
In order to assess the quantitative relevance of the endogenous specialization
premium generated in our framework, we calibrate our two symmetric country, one
sector setting to the U.S. manufacturing sector from 2000 to 2007. In our calibrated
model, the evolution of the intermediates production share can be well explained by
variations in import penetration during this period.
To gauge how much additional gains from trade is due to the endogenous
specialization premium, we contrast the impact of trade cost reductions relative
to a model where the specialization premium is fixed. We find that endogenous
specialization premium contributes to around 20% of the overall welfare gains from
trade relative to autarky in our framework.
Closely related to our paper is the work by Yi (2003, 2010), who uses multi-
stage production to explain the growth in world trade volumes since the 1980s and
the home bias in trade. Instead of using multi-stage production, in our framework
all goods are used both for final consumption and intermediates as in most quan-
titative trade models. While both approaches imply an increase in the trade share
of intermediates after a reduction in trade costs, our framework also implies an in-
crease in the average intermediates’ production share in the economy, whereas in
the models with multi-stage production it is fixed.5
5The intermediates’ production share is also fixed in the work by Fieler et al. (2014), where firms
substitute high quality for low quality intermediates due to lower price of high quality intermediates
after trade with high income countries.
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Our paper also relates to the recent literature that studies firm heterogeneity in
importing. For example, Antras et al. (2014) builds a framework where firms differ
in the number of destinations they source for intermediates, and Ramanarayanan
(2014) develops a framework where firms differ in the share of intermediates that
are imported. Our framework does not have firm heterogeneity in the above two
dimensions, but firms are different in terms of total share of intermediates used in
production.
Moreover, our paper relates to the recent literature that focuses on the welfare
gains from trade. We highlight the role of endogenous specialization premium in
generating larger welfare gains from trade by comparing to a special case of our
model with a fixed specialization premium. In the spirit of Melitz and Redding
(2015), we show that the same reductions in trade costs imply larger welfare gains
under endogenous specialization premium when the two frameworks have the same
initial aggregate outcomes. Using the sufficient statistics approach as in Arkolakis
et al. (2012), we also show that in the fixed specialization premium framework the
gains from trade can be represented as a simple function of three sufficient statistics:
the degree of openess, the trade elasticity, and the fixed share of intermediates in
production. However, in our setting with an endogenous specialization premium that
is no longer possible; we now require information on the specialization premium.
Moreover, in the fixed specialization model, trade liberalization leaves the wage
share of national income unchanged since real wages and profits (due to restricted
entry) increase at similar rates, but with an endogenous premium, profits increase
faster than wages. Thus the endogenous specialization channel implies a lower share
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of wages in national income due to liberalization, which is consistent with recent
declines in that share for some countries.6
Finally, our framework implies that an increase in market size increases the
specialization premium. Therefore, a larger market size increases the degree of
specialization within the firm, as illustrated in Chaney and Ossa (2013). This also
implies that welfare gains from trade depend on the size of initial market. In a
version of our framework with free entry, we show that a reduction in trade cost
increases the number of potential entrants and generates larger welfare gains than
our fixed number of entrants benchmark. This result is consistent with the findings
by Goldberg et al. (2010) that lower import tariffs in India accounted for on average
31% of the new products introduced by domestic firms (captured in our framework
by new entry) through firm’s access to new imported varieties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents some cross
country evidence on changes in intermediates production share and imported inter-
mediates share. Section 2.3 and 2.4 develop the theoretical framework and solve
for the equilibrium. Section 2.5 derives some comparative statics on trade share of
intermediates and welfare gains from trade. Section 2.6 takes our theoretical frame-
work to the data on U.S. manufacturing. Section 2.7 investigates the robustness of
the implications of our framework under alternative model specifications. Section
2.8 concludes.
6This channel implies a potential for distributional impacts if we allow profits to be unevenly
redistributed across households. We implicitly assume profits are evenly redistributed to all house-
holds but conjecture that the aggregate results (other than income distribution) would be similar
under uneven shares.
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2.2 Cross Country Evidence
In this section we provide some cross country evidence on the rising shares of
intermediates in manufacturing production and trade from 1997 to 2007. This will
provide some motivation for our focus on intermediates and for certain elements of
the model.
The changes in intermediates production share, defined as the ratio of inter-
mediates expenditure to total production cost for 67 countries is shown in Table 2.1.
The first column decomposes the data in Figure 2.1 into 9 manufacturing industries.




All manu 6.3 3.7 2.6
Food -0.7 -2.2 1.5
Textile 3.1 0.2 2.9
Wood 3.5 1.3 2.2
Chemical 11.2 9.1 2.1
Metal 6.2 3.3 3.0
Motor 5.8 4.7 1.2
Electronic 8.7 2.9 5.8
Machine 7.9 4.5 3.4
Rest manu 2.2 1.2 1.0
Notes: The table presents the average percentage changes in intermediates produc-
tion share from 1997 to 2007 across 67 countries in the manufacturing sector, weighted
by total production costs. Intermediates production share in the first column is de-
fined as the total expenditure on intermediates over total production cost. The last
two columns decompose the changes in the 1st column into within and between in-
dustry changes.
First, we note that the share increased by at least 2 percentage points in all but one
industry.
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Second, we decompose the change into growth within countries and production


















































denote the average weights and intermediates share be-
tween the two periods. In the penultimate column of Table 2.1 we see that the
within change accounts for nearly 60% of the effect for manufacturing as a whole
and it is positive for all industries except food. The last column shows that in each
industry there is production reallocation towards countries with higher intermediate
production share.
Third, instead of computing the weighted average, the first three columns of
Table 2.2 present the median and simple average changes in intermediates produc-
tion share across countries. The main observation is that the magnitudes of the
increases in intermediates production share are significantly smaller for almost all
industries under the median and simple average. The reason is that large countries
tend to have larger increases in intermediates production share, suggesting that
firms need to reach some scale to utilize intermediates.
Having established the fact that the aggregate intermediates production share
in manufacturing has increased over the period, we then ask what factors might
be driving this rise. The fourth column of Table 2.2 reveals that for all industries
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Table 2.2: Intermediates production share and imported intermediates share (%)
%∆ in production share %∆ in imported int share
weighted avg median simple avg weighted avg median simple avg correlation
All manu 6.3 0.6 0.4 3.2 0.8 0.1 17.2
Food -0.7 -2.0 -3.2 0.1 1.2 0.3 7.7
Textile 3.1 -1.3 -2.3 -1.7 2.0 1.5 29.2
Wood 3.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.4 26.6
Chemical 11.2 6.2 5.3 6.1 1.0 0.8 27.4
Metal 6.2 4.0 3.2 4.5 3.9 3.6 23.3
Motor 5.8 0.6 0.2 3.7 0.6 1.5 53.9
Electronic 8.7 -1.4 -2.1 0.3 -5.9 -5.7 53.8
Machine 7.9 2.7 1.1 0.9 -0.8 -2.4 44.6
Rest manu 2.2 4.2 1.4 1.8 0.8 1.7 50.8
Notes: The last column presents the correlation between the weighted average
changes in intermediates production share and imported intermediates share across
67 countries in the sample.
except textiles, the imported intermediates share, defined by the ratio of expendi-
tures on imported intermediates to total intermediates, has increased. It suggests
that international trade may be responsible for the rising intermediates production
share. The last column of Table 2.2 further supports the hypothesis by comput-
ing the simple correlation between changes in intermediates production share and
imported intermediates share across countries, which is positive for all industries.
The positive correlations in table 2.2 may be driven by specific countries that
have liberalized and adopted more intermediates. Column two of table 2.3 presents
the regression results when we control for country specific changes. The positive
correlation is still there. The result is also robust to industry specific changes and
removing outliers. To address the concern that some of the correlation is mechanical,
the last two columns of table 2.3 presents the results when we instrument the changes
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Table 2.3: Changes in intermediates production share and imported intermediates
share from 1997 to 2007: pooled estimation
∆ Intermediates production share
OLS 2SLS 1st stage
∆ Imported
intermediates share
0.35 0.49 0.49 0.38 0.32
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.19)
∆ Tariff 0.19
(0.08)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No outliers Yes
N 603 603 603 603 603 603
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. The table presents the coefficients of
regressing changes in intermediates production share on imported intermediates share
pooled across 9 manufacturing industries and 67 countries. The unit of observation is
the change in intermediates production share from 1997 to 2007 in a country industry.
The instrument for changes in imported intermediates share is the average changes in
destination country tariff weighted by 1997 bilateral import share. The last column
shows the first stage results. The coefficients of the third column differ from the
second column in the third decimal place.
in imported intermediates share with average changes in import tariffs. We see that
the positive correlation remains and the first stage result indicates the validity of
the instrument.
Finally, we investigate whether substitution of production factors is between
intermediates and labor, capital or both. We compute changes in capital augmented
intermediates production share, defined as the sum of expenditures on intermedi-
ates and capital over total production cost, and compare to our previous measure
of intermediates share in Figure 2.2. We see that the two measures give similar
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Food Textile Wood Chemical Metal Motor Electronic Machine Restm Whole
intermediates only
intermediates+capital
Notes: The figure compares the average percentage changes in intermediates produc-
tion share under two definitions. The ones that include capital (right bar) is computed
as the sum of expenditures on intermediates and capital over total production cost
in each industry.
magnitudes in changes in all industries except chemicals.7 Therefore in our theoret-
ical framework we focus only on substitution between labor and intermediates and
abstract from capital.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
The trade model with one sector and two symmetric countries is based on
Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). Each country is endowed with L units of labor.




Consumers in each country have the same preferences over the differentiated







 σσ−1 , σ > 1, (2.2)
where Ω is the set of domestically produced and imported varieties available to
consumers. This gives rise to the following consumer demand for variety ω:
q(ω) = EP σ−1p(ω)−σ, (2.3)







where p(ω) is the price of variety ω and E is the aggregate consumer expenditure.
2.3.2 Technology
There is a measure M of potential entrants in each country and the market
structure is monopolistic competition. Each firm j owns a blueprint to produce a
single variety with productivity ϕ(j), which is the realization of a random variable
ϕ distributed as pareto:










drawn independently across each firm in each country. Here, the location param-
eter ϕmin reflects the lower bound of the productivity distribution, and the shape
parameter k is an inverse measure of the dispersion of productivities.
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After productivity ϕ(j) is realized, each firm chooses between two types of
production technologies with constant returns to scale and decides whether to enter
the market. The inferior technology uses only labor and requires the firm to pay
a fixed cost of fn units of labor. The advanced technology combines the services
of both labor and intermediates sourced from other firms, but requires the firm to
pay a larger fixed cost of fn + fa units of labor. We assume that the intermediates’
bundle is the same as the consumption bundle, which implies that both have the





w1−αPα v = a, pays fn + fa,
w
ϕ
v = n, pays fn,
(2.6)
where w is the wage rate and φ is the fixed productivity change from using inter-
mediates. We assume that ca(ϕ) < cn(ϕ) so that firms trade off lower variable costs
from using intermediates with larger fixed cost of production.
This formulation is isomorphic to one where the firm pays fn and uses a fraction
of labor to produce inputs in house using a linear technology and the remaining
fraction, 1 − α, to assemble it. Thus we can interpret the technology adoption as
one where labor is released from producing less efficient intermediates to specializing
in other tasks. In appendix B.2, we show that our framework is invariant to a
model with two-stage production where firms have the option to specialize in more
productive tasks within the firm.
8It can be rationalized with competitive intermediates bundle producers assembling available
varieties ω ∈ Ω using a CES technology with elasticity of substitution σ.
9Comparing with the literature on firm importing, we ignore firm heterogeneity on importing
and assume that all firms using intermediates import all varieties exported by another country.
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Firms also decide whether to export by paying a fixed cost of fx units of labor
and incurring a per unit iceberg cost of τ . In equilibrium, firms maximize profits by
choosing technology type and deciding whether to export.
2.4 Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the equilibrium of the model in two steps. First,
we solve for the firm’s optimal decisions on technology adoption and exporting.
Second, we solve for the general equilibrium of the economy by aggregating firm-
level decisions.
2.4.1 Optimal Firm Behavior
We solve for the firm’s optimal technology choice by first describing its optimal
profits conditional on any given technology adoption decisions. Technology adoption
decisions involve only firms serving the domestic market because we focus on the
equilibrium where all exporters optimally specialize.
A firm’s domestic profit given technology choice v is








−σ is firm ϕ’s demand, which is the
sum of household demand for consumption and other firms’ demand for intermedi-















1−σ − w(fd + 1(v = a)fa), v = n, a, (2.9)
where A = E + α
∫
ca(ϕ)q(ϕ).
Conditional on its underlying productivity, each firm chooses the technology
which yields larger profit. As the intermediates technology has strictly lower vari-
able cost (ca(ϕ) < cn(ϕ)) but larger fixed cost of production, only firms that are
productive enough have the incentive to adopt. The adoption threshold ϕ̄a is the
productivity at which firms are indifferent between using intermediates or not:
πnd (ϕ̄a) = π
a
d(ϕ̄a). (2.10)






















. The adoption threshold is lower the larger the
reductions in variable cost from using intermediates ( ca
w
) and the smaller the fixed
cost of adoption (fa).
Firms also have the choice of exporting to the other country. The profit from
exports given fixed exporting cost fx and variable iceberg cost τ is
πx(ϕ) = [px(ϕ)− τca(ϕ)] qx(ϕ)− wfx. (2.12)















1−σ − wfx. (2.14)
Lastly, the presence of fixed costs of production (exporting) implies that not all
firms sell domestically (export). The productivity threshold of domestic producers
ϕ̄n is given by firms who just break even:
πnd (ϕ̄n) = 0. (2.15)










Similarly, the export threshold ϕ̄x is given by the firms who break even in the export
market:











We focus our analysis on the equilibrium in which ϕ̄n < ϕ̄a < ϕ̄x because we
want to investigate the effects of trade liberalization on the production structure of
a large set of firms, not only the relatively small share that engage in international
trade. Both the adoption threshold and most implications of our framework depend
crucially on the specialization premium:
Definition 2.4.1. The specialization premium, which captures the unit cost savings










The specialization premium is increasing in the fixed productivity effects from
adoption (φ) and in the relative cost of labor to intermediates (w
P
). It is endogenous
in our framework because it depends on the price of the intermediates bundle.
2.4.2 General Equilibrium
We now aggregate the firm-level optimal decisions and derive the market clear-
ing conditions. We normalize w = 1.
Total sales in a given country are given by the sum of sales of domestic pro-
ducers and exporters:


















By goods market clearing this must equal total expenditure (X) in that market,
which is the sum of household and firm expenditures:
Y = X = L+ Π + α
σ − 1
σ
(Y − Yn), (2.21)
where Π is total profits of all firms, L + Π = E is total household expenditure,
and ασ−1
σ
(Y − Yn) = α
∫
ca(ϕ)q(ϕ) is total firm expenditure. So we have in the
equilibrium X = A = E + α
∫
ca(ϕ)q(ϕ).
Labor market clearing implies that total payments to labor equals the labor
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The two countries are symmetric so trade balance always holds.
The static trade equilibrium is defined as follows: Given price index P and
total sales X:
1. Consumers maximize the utility in (2.2);
2. Firms maximize profits by deciding whether to produce, adopt or export;
3. Goods and labor markets clear.
2.4.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The rankings of productivity thresholds ϕ̄n < ϕ̄a < ϕ̄x place restrictions on
the specialization premium. First, ϕ̄n < ϕ̄a implies that the specialization premium








Second, ϕ̄a < ϕ̄x implies that the specialization premium is large enough to induce








Observe that the last inequality is the necessary condition for the existence of spe-
cialization premium. We summarize the above findings in the following lemma:
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Lemma 2.4.1. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium












In the following we derive a sufficient condition for the existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium in our framework. We can write the equilibrium of the model in
































































In Figure 2.3, we plot the equilibrium of the model using two curves involving the
price schedule (2.26) and the specialization schedule (2.27). Therefore to prove
existence and uniqueness we need to show that the intersection in Figure 2.3 is
unique. The following proposition provides sufficient conditions for this to hold.
Existence
For existence, first note that both the price schedule (P ) and specialization
schedule (Ps) are continuous in sa for sa ≥ 1.
10See appendix B.3.2 for details.
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Second, when sa →∞, the price schedule is bounded above 0, since for a large
enough specialization premium s̄a > 0, all firms use intermediates and in such an
economy P (s̄a) > 0 because further increases in specialization premium do not affect
the price schedule. Moreover, the specialization schedule approaches 0 as sa →∞.
Thus there exists a b > 0 such that P (sa) > Ps(sa) when sa > b.
Third, both the price schedule and specialization schedule are bounded at sa =
1. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium is P (1) < Ps(1),
which is ensured if φ is large enough because Ps(1) = φ
1
α and the price schedule
does not involve φ.
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Uniqueness
For uniqueness, in addition to the conditions that ensure the existence of










, for sa ≥ 1. (2.28)
Thus when α→ 0, there always exists a unique equilibrium because the slope of the
price schedule is finite and independent of α given sa.
We summarize the results above in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.4.2. There exists a φ̄ > 0 such that the model has an equilibrium with
sa > 1. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique for any α < ᾱ.
From now on, we assume that the sufficient condition for existence of a unique
equilibrium (2.28) holds and proceed to derive some comparative statics.
2.5 Trade Flows and Welfare
What are the effects of reductions in trade costs on trade flows and welfare?
We answer this question by deriving some comparative statics and comparing with
other quantitative trade models.
Because most implications of our framework arise from endogenous special-
ization premium, we first derive a restricted version of our model where the spe-
cialization premium is fixed. We then highlight the implications of endogenous
specialization premium on trade share of intermediates, trade elasticity, and welfare
90
following a reduction in trade cost. Finally, we discuss the effect of initial market
size on the welfare gains from trade.
2.5.1 Fixed Specialization Premium Framework
We construct the fixed specialization premium model as the following:
Definition 2.5.1. The fixed specialization premium framework has the same settings






w1−βP β v = a, pays fn + fa,
1
ϕe
w1−βP β v = n, pays fn,
(2.29)
where β is the fixed intermediates production share, T is the fixed productivity ad-
vantage of adopters, and e is a parameter which adjusts the size of the economy.
Notice that the fixed specialization premium model is the Bustos (2011b) type
framework extended to allow all firms to use a constant β share of intermediate
inputs. We can therefore parameterize the fixed specialization premium model to
have the same initial equilibrium as our framework.
Proposition 2.5.1. The fixed specialization premium model with β = αλa(0),





has the same equilibrium as our framework, where
x(0) denotes an endogenous variable in the initial equilibrium of our framework. In
particular, the two models have the same initial productivity thresholds, labor shares,
outputs, and welfare.
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Proof. The two models have the same average intermediates production share as
β = αλa(0), implying that they have the same initial sales Y (0). From T = sa(0)
as well as the same adoption and exporting costs, the two models have the same
fractions of adopters and exporters from the definitions of productivity thresholds
(2.15), (2.10), (2.17). These arguments imply that productivity thresholds are the
same. Finally, the scale parameter e ensures the fixed specialization premium model










In essence, proposition 2.5.1 generates a 1-1 mapping between our framework
and the fixed specialization premium model.
2.5.2 Endogenous Specialization Premium
We now derive the effects of reductions in trade costs on various model out-
comes by emphasizing the role of endogenous specialization premium. To fix ideas,













d ln τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect
.
The first term represents the direct effect of changes in trade cost on the economy
holding the specialization premium fixed, which is the only channel operating in the
fixed specialization framework. Under endogenous specialization, there is also an
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indirect effect if trade costs affects the specialization premium, which in turn affects
outcome x.
First, we show that declines in trade costs increase the specialization premium.



















Therefore it is equivalent to show that d lnP
d ln τ
> 0. The effect of changes in trade cost


















captures the direct effect of trade costs on price given
specialization premium, and the second term is the indirect effect from changes in























> 0 because reductions in trade costs decrease the
price index due to lower price of existing varieties and availability of new ones. From
the sufficient condition of the existence of an unique equilibrium (2.28), 1+α ∂ lnP
∂ ln sa
>




Lemma 2.5.1 implies that if changes in specialization premium also affect an
economic outcome, the indirect effect is non-zero. The next lemma shows that
endogenous specialization premium amplifies the changes in fractions of adopters
and exporters.
Lemma 2.5.2. Declines in variable or fixed trade costs increase both the fractions














Moreover, the responses are larger under endogenous specialization premium given
the same reductions in trade costs.
Proof. By definition, χa =
1−G(ϕ̄a)
1−G(ϕ̄n) and χx =
1−G(ϕ̄x)
1−G(ϕ̄n) . Utilizing the expressions for





































































where last steps we use dsa
dτ
< 0 from lemma 2.5.1. Because the indirect effects
(terms involving d ln sa
d ln τ
) are negative, endogenous specialization premium reinforces
the direct effects.
Intuitively, lemma 2.5.2 says that after a reduction in trade cost, a larger frac-
tion of firms use intermediates as the specialization premium goes up.11 There is also
a larger share of exporters due to lower unit cost for exporters generated by larger
specialization premium. Both effects are absent under fixed specialization premium.
Moreover, the indirect effect is the only force that generates an increase in the frac-
tion of adopters so that endogenous specialization premium has the possibility to
generate more domestic adopters.
Endogenous specialization premium also generates larger increase in the sales
share of adopters as we show in the following lemma:








Moreover, the response is larger under endogenous specialization premium.
Proof. It is equivalent to show that d ln(1−λa)
d ln τ
> 0. Aggregating firm-level sales and
using the expression for pareto (2.5), sales share of non-adopters can be expressed
11Lemma 2.5.2 does not imply that the productivity threshold of adopters ϕ̄a decreases. There
is an effect of tougher market competition which tends to increase the threshold. In Melitz (2003),
the same effect decreases the sales of the marginal exporter.
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> 0, therefore it reinforces the direct effect.
Intuitively, sales share of intermediates users increases when trade costs fall
both because exporters sell more and some domestic firms upgrade to use interme-
diates. Because in our framework, only the adopters use intermediates, so that the
intermediates production share αλa also increases. Under fixed specialization frame-
work, the intermediates production share is fixed at β. One immediate implication
of proposition 2.5.3 is that the labor share is increasing in trade costs.








Proof. We can simplify the labor market clearing condition (2.22) with the pareto








k − σ + 1
kσ
.12






. Together with dλa
dτ
< 0 from lemma 2.5.3, we
obtain dλl
dτ




We now derive the effects of changes in trade costs on the trade share of
intermediates.








Proof. Since the consumption bundle is the same as the intermediates bundle, the
trade share of intermediates equals their share in expenditures:
v =






where λaY is the total sales of intermediates users. Applying lemma 2.5.3 completes
the proof.
The trade share of intermediates increases after reductions in trade costs be-
cause of the rising sales share of firms that use intermediates. Note that under fixed
12See appendix B.3 for details of the derivation.
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specialization premium v = σ−1
σ
β is fixed because all firms use the same share of
intermediate inputs.
Our framework also implies a different trade elasticity due to endogenous spe-





























where x = (fa/fn)
1− k
σ−1 . The trade elasticity, defined as the elasticity of import
relative to domestic demand with respect to trade costs holding income constant,
can be written as
ητ =
∣∣∣∣∂ ln γ∂ ln τ














We can interpret the first term as the partial trade elasticity in a Chaney
(2008) type framework, in which the specialization premium is fixed at sa = 1.
The second term can be interpreted as the elasticity allowing for upgrading given
a fixed sa > 1. The last term captures the effect from endogenous changes in the
specialization premium, which only our framework possesses.
First observe that the effect of upgrading given the specialization premium,
is zero: ∂ lnS
∂ ln τ
= 0. This is because the marginal adopter is a pure domestic firm so
that changes in trade costs only affect them through the specialization premium.13
13If the marginal adopter is an exporter, this is no longer the case.
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1. Because d ln sa
d ln τ
< 0, endogenous specialization increases the trade elasticity. We
summarize the findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5.3. The trade elasticity, defined as the elasticity of import relative
to domestic demand with respect to trade costs holding income constant, can be
written as
ητ =
∣∣∣∣∂ ln γ∂ ln τ





which is larger than the elasticity under no intermediates or a fixed specialization
premium.
Proposition 2.5.3 shows that our framework implies a larger and non-constant
trade elasticity. The intuition is that an increase in the specialization premium
increases the sales of adopters, because not all domestic firms adopt and use in-
termediates, the trade share increases. Therefore our work complements the study
by Yi (2003) and provides another explanation from the side of production for the
growth of world trade.
Another implication of proposition 2.5.3 is that for gravity type estimation
trying to retrieve the value of k by regressing γ on ln τ , we get biased estimates
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in (2.5.3), which is de-
creasing in trade costs. Therefore, estimate of k from gravity equation is biased
upward.
We finish the discussion on trade flow by breaking it into the intensive and
extensive margins. Fernandes et al. (2017) documented that around 50% of the
variations in trade flows across countries operate in the intensive margin, for which
the Melitz (2003) model with pareto distribution cannot explain. In our framework,
total exports can be expressed as
Yx =
σk




and the number of firms that export, or the extensive margin is
Nx = M (ϕmin)
k (ϕ̄x)
−k . (2.40)






k − σ + 1
fx. (2.41)
This is the same expression as the Melitz (2003) model so that our framework also
implies all adjustments are in the intensive margin if fixed export costs are source
or destination specific. The intuition is that changes in specialization premium
uniformly affect all exporters because they all use intermediates.14
14If the marginal adopter is an exporter, this is no longer the case.
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2.5.4 Welfare
Larger sales share of intermediates users after reductions in trade costs not
only imply larger percentage growth in trade flows, but also larger welfare gains from
trade compared to trade models without the possibility of intermediates adoption.
We show this first by deriving sufficient statistics for welfare gains from trade, in
the spirit of Arkolakis et al. (2012) and then compare with existing trade models.
Because in our current setting the number of potential entrants, M is fixed,
in equilibrium firms generate positive profits which are redistributed to households.
This may imply that the share of wage income in total household income is not
constant.











Moreover, λw is constant if average intermediates production share, αλa is constant.













Utilizing simplified labor market clearing condition as in the proof of lemma 2.5.4,

























and λa is decreasing in trade cost from lemma 2.5.3, we get λw
is increasing in trade cost.
Lemma 2.5.5 has two implications. First, in standard trade models without the
possibility of intermediates adoption, welfare gains from trade in terms of relative
changes in real wage and real household income are the same. Therefore they cannot
explain the changes in labor income share due to trade liberalization. Second, there
are additional gains in our framework due to limited entry if welfare is measured in
terms of relative change in real household income. To better compare the welfare
gains from trade to models with free entry, we measure changes in welfare in terms
of real wage.
We start from the expression for the adoption cutoff (2.11). Welfare in terms
















Utilizing Y = L
λl
, changes in welfare due to reductions in trade costs can be expressed
as





1−σ ( ˆ̄ϕa), (2.44)
where x̂ = x
′
x
denotes the relative change of variable x. We can further simplify the
last term and obtain the following proposition:
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fn (ϕ̄n)
−k + fa (ϕ̄a)
−k .
We can therefore write domestic sales of adopters as
Ya = λdλxY =
σk
























k fa is a constant. Substituting it back to expression
(2.44) yields the welfare expression.
Proposition 2.5.4 shows that changes in welfare depend on five sufficient statis-
tics: (i) the share of labor payments in total income, λl; (ii) the domestic expendi-
ture share, λx; (iii) the domestic sales share of adopters, λd; (iv) the dispersion of
productivity distribution, k; and (v) the specialization premium, sa.
The observation that the specialization premium is one of the sufficient statis-
tics for welfare gains is what distinguishes our framework with the fixed specializa-
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tion premium model, in which the welfare formula as described in Arkolakis et al.
(2012) still holds:
Proposition 2.5.5. The effect of changes in trade costs on the welfare of fixed

























implying that Ŵe = (̂ϕ̄ea)
1
1−β













−k and λl =
σ−1
σ
(1 − β) + k−σ+1
kσ
. Clearly, changes
























Intuitively, there is no amplification on the specialization premium and labor
share in the fixed specialization premium model because the labor share and fraction
of adopters do not respond to changes in trade costs. Moreover, the amplification
from endogenous specialization premium increases the welfare gains from trade, as
illustrated in the following proposition:
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Proposition 2.5.6. Given the same reductions in trade costs, endogenous special-
ization implies larger welfare gains from trade than the fixed specialization premium

















. First observe that the price index































k and T = sa(0),
β = αλa(0) from proposition 2.5.1. Let X = (fn)
1− k
















From the proof of proposition 2.5.1, effects of changes in trade costs on the price














The direct effect in the numerator can be further decomposed into the effects on




















= (1− β)d lnPe
d ln τ
,
where the inequality follows from proposition 2.5.4 that labor share is increasing in
trade costs. Note that the direct effect on X is the same as the fixed specialization
premium model so the direct effect under our framework is larger.
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The indirect effect from endogenous specialization premium can also be de-



















where the inequality is from λa is increasing in specialization premium (proposition



























and we utilize β = αλa(0) from proposition 2.5.1.
Intuitively, our framework yields larger welfare gains because the labor share
λl is increasing in trade cost. Both the direct effect of reductions in trade cost
and the indirect effect from endogenous specialization premium on the labor share
amplify the welfare gains.
2.5.5 Market Size
Under fixed specialization premium, potential number of entrants M and labor
supply L do not affect the welfare gains from trade. From (2.5.5), welfare depends
only on changes in domestic expenditure share, which the size of the market does
not affect. However, under our framework a larger market size implies a larger
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specialization premium and magnifies the welfare gains from trade, as illustrated in
the following proposition:








Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of proposition 2.5.1. We take out the

























we get d ln sa
d lnM
= −α d lnP
d lnM
, so it is equivalent to show that d lnP
d lnM
< 0. The effect of


















captures the direct effect of market size on price given
specialization premium, and the second term is the indirect effect from changes
in specialization premium. Using d ln sa
d lnM
= −α d lnP
d lnM





























= 0. Using the
sufficient condition of the existence of an unique equilibrium, 1 +α ∂ lnP
∂ ln sa
> 0, we get
d lnP
d lnM




Intuitively, a larger market size implies larger sales for every firm, therefore
more firms have an incentive to use intermediates so that the specialization premium
increases. Proposition 2.5.7 also implies that an increase in market size increases
the fractions of adopters and exporters, sales share of adopters, and trade share of
intermediates, because all these variables are increasing in the specialization pre-
mium.
Moreover, welfare gains from trade depend on initial market size in our frame-
work. Because a larger market size implies a larger specialization premium, it is
possible that given the same reductions in trade costs, a larger initial market size
implies larger welfare gains.16 Later we show that in a version of our framework
with free entry, a reduction in trade cost increases the number of potential entrants,
and implies larger welfare gains from trade.
2.6 Quantification
In this section, we use our two symmetric country model and perform a simple
quantitative exercise using US manufacturing data from 2000-2007. We have three
objectives. First, we check if our simple framework can match any of the changes
in intermediates production share in U.S. manufacturing. Second, we carry out
counterfactuals by varying the levels of trade costs in order to quantitatively assess
the model’s predictions on trade share of intermediates and welfare gains from trade.
16Note that propositions 2.5.4 and 2.5.7 are not sufficient to ensure a larger market size generates
larger welfare gains because an increase in domestic sales share of adopters (λd) decreases the
welfare gains from (2.5.4).
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Third, we compare these liberalization outcomes to those in the fixed specialization
premium model.
2.6.1 Data
We use data from NBER CES database. Ideally, we want to measure inter-
mediates production share as expenditure on intermediates over total production
costs. However, as payments to some factors are not observable, such as capital,
total production cost cannot be computed directly from the data. Instead we as-
sume that the production function utilizes some specific factor that is unobserved





pays fn + fa,
kβl1−β pays fn,
(2.49)
where l is the amount of observed factor (labor in the model) and x is the amount
of intermediates. If we know the share of this unobserved factor β, we can then
compute the intermediates production share as α(1 − β). This can be done by










where Enk is total expenditure on observed factors, Ek is total expenditure on un-




17In appendix B.1.2, we show that the observed expenditure to sales ratio has not changed
much since 2000, implying that there was little substitution between intermediates and unobserved
factors (for e.g. capital).
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the model’s constant markup η = σ
σ−1 , we have





Therefore we can compute the true intermediates production share α(1− β) as





where Ex is intermediates expenditure constructed as material costs minus energy
costs. We use σ = 4 to compute the constant markup.
Figure 2.4 plots the intermediates production share against import penetration
in the U.S. manufacturing sector. We see that there is an increase in intermediates
Figure 2.4: Import penetration and intermediates production share: 1995-2009
import penetration in manufacturing




































Notes: Import penetration is computed as ratio of total manufacturing import values
to total manufacturing absorption.
production share post 2000 following the increase in import penetration. We disci-
pline our model based on this period of increasing intermediates production share
between 2000 and 2007.
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2.6.2 Calibration
In the framework, two types of shocks affect intermediates production share.
The first type relates to shocks to export costs: variable τ and fixed fx, while
the second type relates to shocks to technology adoption: fixed boost φ and fixed
adoption cost fa. Because at the industry level we only observe changes in import
penetration but not firm heterogeneity on intermediates usage, we make the strong
assumption that changes in intermediates production share in the data are driven
by trade shocks only.18 In essence, we are asking whether changes in trade costs
alone can explain the rise in intermediates production share using our framework.
The quantitative effects from changes in trade cost are an upper bound, as some of
them may be due to technological change.
Because we only observe one data moment relating to trade costs, which is the
import penetration, we make further assumptions that all changes in trade costs are
due to the iceberg cost τ . Doing it instead for fixed export cost fx gives the same
quantitative results as changes in trade costs affect firm’s specialization decision
indirectly through changes in the specialization premium.
In sum, the only time-varying parameter in our framework is the iceberg cost
τ . Fixed exporting cost fx, fixed boost φ, technology intermediates share α, and
the fixed adoption cost fa are time-invariant.
18An example of shocks to fa is computerization.
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2.6.2.1 Assigned Parameters
The pareto shape parameter k = 4 and the elasticity of substitution σ = 4.
The parameters relating to the scale of the economy are also assigned as they do not
affect levels of intermediates production share and welfare gains. Following Melitz
and Redding (2015), we normalize fn = ϕmin = 1, and let total labor force L to be





The most important steps of the calibration involves finding the values of
parameters relating to technology adoption: α, φ, and fa. We utilize variations in
intermediates production share and TFP growth from 2000 to 2007 to estimate them.
Intuitively, a reduction in variable trade cost increases the sales share of adopters,
so that sector intermediates production share increases. On the other hand, sector
TFP also increases because some firms upgrade and some least productive firms
drop out.
As in the NBER CES database, real output in each sector is computed using
industry price deflators, the model counterpart of sector TFP is the harmonic firm
19In the Melitz model, the number of potential entrants is proportional to total labor force and
given by this expression if fixed cost of entry fe is normalized to 1.
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σ − k − 1




σ−1 − 1] (ϕ̄a)σ−k−2 + τ 1−σ(sa)σ−1 (ϕ̄x)σ−k−2
(ϕ̄n)
σ−k−1 + [(sa)σ−1 − 1] (ϕ̄a)σ−k−1 + τ 1−σ(sa)σ−1 (ϕ̄x)σ−k−1
(2.53)
In each year, the model perfectly matches the observed import penetration
and targets intermediates production share in the data. Moreover, we also target
TFP growth in the U.S. manufacturing between 2000 and 2007. In essence, we find
the parameters of the model by minimizing the distance between the model-implied



















where ᾱ is the sector intermediates production share in the data and x̃ denotes an
endogenous variable x in the model.
The calibration procedure is the following. Given trade shares in the data, as
well as the guesses for values of α, fa, and φ, we can solve for the equilibrium of
the model year by year. We then compute intermediates production share αλa and
TFP growth for this given set of parameters. We search through possible values of
α, fa, and φ and find the ones that satisfy (2.54). The details are in appendix B.4.
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2.6.2.3 Model Fit
Table 2.4 presents the calibrated parameters. One thing to note is that the
specialization premium at the initial year 2000 is around 1.25.20 The fit of the
Table 2.4: Calibrated Parameters
data moments parameter values
intermediates share
TFP growth α = 0.76, fa = 2.30, φ = 0.123, sa(00) = 1.25
trade share τ(00) to τ(07): τ(00) = 1.36
fraction of exporters fx = 2.84
Notes: The table presents the calibrated parameters. Intermediates production share
in the data is the average industry intermediates production share weighted by sales.
Trade share in the data is the observed import penetration ratio. Average sector
TFP growth is weighted by industry sales.
model is presented in Figure 2.5. We see that the fit on changes in intermediates
production share is quite good but the fit on TFP growth is poor. The reason may
be that trade shocks are not major drivers of industry TFP change.
2.6.3 Counterfactuals
Armed with a framework which is able to explain the variations in sector
intermediates production share in the data, we investigate the effects of changes in
variable trade costs on the trade share of intermediates and welfare.
20The magnitude of the specialization premium is consistent with the estimates of the effects of
imported intermediates on productivity in the literature. For example, Halpern et al. (2015) esti-
mates that using imported intermediates in production would increase a firm’s revenue productivity
by 22% for Hungary.
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Figure 2.5: Intermediates production share and TFP growth: model VS data
data ᾱ

























data TFP growth (%)
































Figure 2.6: Effects of changes in variable trade cost: baseline

































































Notes: The bottom right figure plots the welfare relative to autarky.
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Figure 2.6 presents the counterfactuals of varying variable trade costs. We
see that at high levels of trade cost, the specialization premium is low so that not
many firms adopt, implying low intermediates production share and small welfare
gains. When trade cost is low enough (around 1.5), the specialization premium is
large enough so that a larger fraction of firms begin to use intermediates, leading to
sizable increase in trade share of intermediates and welfare gains.
Figure 2.7: Share of potential entrants that adopt
τ
























One thing to note is that not only the fraction but also the total number of
firms that adopt increases (ϕ̄a decreases). This is presented in Figure 2.7, where we
show that the share of potential entrants that adopt increases as variable trade cost
falls.21 The reason is that the increase in specialization premium is large enough to
induce some domestic firms to adopt. Therefore we see in Figure 2.6 that even if
the level of trade cost at 2000 is low, reducing it still yields significant welfare gains.
In Figure 2.8, we compare our framework with the fixed specialization pre-
21The number of potential entrants M is fixed, so an increase in the share of potential entrants
that adopt implies a rise in the total number of adopters.
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mium model for the same reductions in variable trade costs. We parameterize the
fixed specialization premium model according to proposition 2.5.1 so that the two
frameworks have the same welfare at 2000. Clearly, the fixed specialization premium
Figure 2.8: Effects of changes in variable trade cost: comparison






































































Notes: The bottom right figure plots the welfare relative to 2000 for each model.
model has constant intermediates production share and trade share of intermediates,
so it can’t explain the increases in these shares as in our framework. Moreover, it
cannot explain the declines in the labor income share. Our framework also generates
larger welfare gains (losses) when trade cost is reduced (increased).
How much additional gains are generated by endogenous specialization pre-
mium? We can compare the welfare gains from the two models, and the difference
is generated by the new channel in our framework. As the two models are pa-
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rameterized to have the same level of variable trade cost at 2000, we conduct a
simple exercise by increasing the variable cost to infinity (autarky). We find that
the gains from trade relative to autarky are 26% in our framework and 21% in the
fixed specialization premium model.22 Therefore, an additional 5 percentage points
of welfare gains come from endogenous specialization, or around 20% of the total
welfare gains in our framework.
2.7 Extensions
In this section, we investigate how the implications of our framework change
under alternative specification of fixed cost and free entry.
2.7.1 Fixed Costs
We assume that all fixed costs are paid in terms of labor. What happens
if they are paid using both labor and intermediates? Consider a setting where
there is a homogeneous good produced by perfectly competitive firms with price
pf = w
1−αλaPαλa , and all fixed costs are paid in terms of this homogeneous good.
All implications of our framework stay unchanged except first, welfare gains from
trade are larger as the real cost of homogeneous good falls after a reduction in
trade cost. This effect is the same as in standard models where fixed costs are paid
in terms of both labor and intermediates, as discussed in Arkolakis et al. (2012).
Second, the labor income share in total national income is constant. Observe that
22In Figure 2.8 the welfare gains are relative to year 2000 but not autarky, so the numbers are
smaller in the figure.
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(1− αλa)Y + (1− αλa)













where total wage payment for fixed costs is only 1−αλa of total fixed costs payment.

























Observe that the share parameter in the fixed cost, αλa, is decreasing in trade
cost. If instead the share is fixed at some constant as in standard trade models, the
result that labor income share is decreasing in trade cost still holds.
2.7.2 Free Entry
We show that under free entry, welfare gains from trade are larger than the case
under fixed number of potential entrants. The intuition is that a larger specialization
premium induces more potential entrants after a reduction in trade cost. In the
following, we first derive the general equilibrium conditions under free entry and
then show both theoretically and quantitatively the free entry version of the model
generates larger welfare gains.
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2.7.2.1 General Equilibrium
Assume that each firm pays an entry fee of fe units of labor, and draw its
productivity from an ex ante pareto distribution G(ϕ). After that the firm decides
whether to produce, adopt, and export. The free entry condition states that ex
ante, expected profit will equal the entry fee
[1−G(ϕ̄n)] π̄ = fe. (2.58)




























− fn v = n,











− fx v = x,
(2.60)
































Utilizing the pareto distribution, the above expression can be further simplified to
(σ − 1)(ϕmin)k
k − σ + 1
[
fn (ϕ̄n)
−k + fa (ϕ̄a)
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−k + fx (ϕ̄x)
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For the labor market, first observe that the variable profit is the sum of fixed
cost payments plus the profit
Y
σ
= F + Π = F +Mfe, (2.64)
where the last step utilizes the free entry condition. Labor market clearing im-
plies that total labor supply equals the sum of labor used in production, fixed cost
















As the labor share λl is constant in the fixed specialization premium model,
M is also fixed under free entry. Therefore, all implications under fixed M carry
over to free entry under fixed specialization premium.
With endogenous specialization premium the labor share is increasing in trade
cost, implying that the number of potential entrants is decreasing in trade costs.
This is the key difference from the fixed M model. Because an increase in M leads
to an increase in the specialization premium from proposition 2.5.7, welfare gains
are likely to be larger.
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2.7.2.2 Welfare
We first define the parameter restrictions on the free entry model to have the
same initial aggregate outcome as restricted entry.
Proposition 2.7.1. Our framework under free entry has the same values of param-























Under the above parameterization the two frameworks have the same initial aggregate
outcome.
We see that the labor supply under free entry is larger. This is because some
of the labor force is used to pay for the entry fee. Now we show that under free
entry welfare gains from trade are larger given the same reduction in trade cost:
Proposition 2.7.2. Given the same reductions in trade costs, endogenous special-
ization with free entry implies larger welfare gains from trade than restricted entry

















. The price equation under free
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We next show that the amplification from changes in labor share is larger under free
entry. From the proof of proposition 2.5.1, effects of changes in trade costs on the














The direct effect in the numerater can be further decomposed into the effects on

































The indirect effect from endogenous specialization premium in the denominator can





































































α) so that λl = C +
k−σ+1
kσ









































where the inequality follows from ∂ lnC
∂ ln τ
> 0. Similarly with ∂ lnC
∂ ln sa











Intuitively, free entry generates larger amplification on the labor share so that
the welfare gains from trade are larger.
2.7.2.3 Quantitative Comparison
What is the quantitative importance of this additional amplification on the
labor share? We address this question by comparing the welfare gains from trade
from changes in iceberg costs. The natural way is to use the same parameters as
in table 2.4. However, the condition for a unique equilibrium is violated under free
entry for this set of parameters. Therefore, we use a smaller value of α = 0.5 and
adjust φ = 0.285 to have the same specialization premium at 2000 for the baseline
calibration.
The two frameworks have the same aggregate outcomes at 2000 level domestic
expenditure share, and the values of fe and LFE are given by proposition 2.7.1.
Figure 2.9 shows the effects of reduction in variable trade cost for the fixed and free
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Figure 2.9: Effects of changes in iceberg cost: fixed VS free entry
τ



















































entry frameworks. We see that free entry amplifies the changes in intermediates
production share, fraction of adopters, and welfare gains.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a tractable trade model in which firms choose whether
to upgrade the technology to use intermediate inputs. The specialization premium
is decreasing in trade costs because imported intermediates lower the price of the
intermediates bundle, which induces more firms to upgrade and use intermediates.
Our framework implies an increase in trade share of intermediates and intermediates
production share after trade liberalization. Moreover, there are additional gains from
trade due to endogenous changes in specialization premium.
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In the quantitative exercise, we show that our simple two symmetric country
setting is able to match the changes in intermediates production share in the U.S.
manufacturing sector. We also show that the additional welfare gains from endoge-
nous specialization premium contributes to 20% of the total welfare gains relative
to autarky.
Looking ahead, our framework is flexible enough and can be applied to solve
other interesting problems. For example, the model can be used to understand the
global decline in labor share across countries. Another interesting application is to
investigate the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the decisions of firms to use
intermediates.
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Appendix A: International Trade, Structural Change and the Skill
Premium
A.1 Calibration Details
This section gives more detail on how I calibrate sectoral production efficiency
T kn .
1. I have to make one normalization in each sector to identify T kn . I choose to
normalize P kROW(2007) = 1 for k ∈ Ω. Using (1.20), T kn (2007) is identified.
2. Given T kn (2007), I back out T
k
US in other periods by matching the average
sectoral productivity growth in the data.
• Average sectoral productivity in the model has to be corrected for inter-
national trade. Following Finicelli et al. (2013),
T̄ kn = Γ
(










so that everything else equal, a more open country (smaller πknn) has
higher average productivity because it produces less goods with low pro-
ductivity.
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• The average yearly productivity growth in agriculture, manufacturing
and services in the U.S. are 3.8%, 2.4% and 1.3% respectively from Her-
rendorf et al. (2013).
• T kUS in other periods are found from T̄AUS(t) = T̄AUS(2007)× 1.038−(2007−t),
T̄MUS(t) = T̄
M
US(2007) × 1.024−(2007−t), T̄ SUS(t) = T̄ SUS(2007) × 1.013−(2007−t)
by assuming same growth rate in sectoral productivity.
3. Back out P kUS(t) in other periods from (1.17), and then retrieve T
k
n (t) in other
periods for n 6= U.S. from (1.20).
A.2 Data
All classifications of industries and countries follow the GTAP codes.
Classification of Industries:
• Agriculture: Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec; Vegetables, fruit, nuts;
Oil seeds; Sugar cane, sugar beet; Plant-based fibers; Crops nec; Cattle,
sheep, goats, horses; Animal products nec; Raw milk; Wool, silk-worm co-
coons; Forestry; Fishing; Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse; Meat products nec;
Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Processed rice; Sugar; Food products
nec; Beverages and tobacco products
• Manufacturing: Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec; Textiles; Wearing apparel;
Leather products; Wood products; Paper products, publishing; Petroleum,
coal products; Chemical,rubber,plastic prods; Mineral products nec; Ferrous
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metals; Metals nec; Metal products; Motor vehicles and parts; Transport
equipment nec; Electronic equipment; Machinery and equipment nec; Man-
ufactures nec
• Services: Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution; Water; Construction;
Trade; Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport; Communication; Financial
services nec; Insurance; Business services nec; Recreation and other services;
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Education; Dwellings
Classification of Regions:
• OECD: Australia (AUS) Austria (AUT) Belgium (BEL) Canada (CAN) Ger-
many (DEU) Denmark (DNK) Spain (ESP) Finland (FIN) France (FRA) UK
(GBR) Greece (GRC) Ireland (IRL) Italy (ITA) Japan (JPN) Korea (KOR)
Luxembourg (LUX) Netherlands (NLD) Portugal (PRT) Sweden (SWE) U.S.
(USA)
• Non-OECD: China (CHN) Indonesia (IDN) India (IND) Philippines (PHL)
Thailand (THA) Argentina (ARG) Brazil (BRA) Chile (CHL) Mexico (MEX)
Peru (PER) Uruguay (URY) Venezuela (VEN) Czech Republic (CZE) Hun-
gary (HUN) Poland (POL) Slovakia (SVK) Slovenia (SVN)
Skill Premium:
The skill premium in each country is computed from the following sources:
• OECD and Eastern European countries: from EU KLEMS. Following Parro
(2013), I use data on the share of total hours worked by high skilled and
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medium skilled workers over 15 years old and the share in total labor compen-
sation to high skilled and medium skilled workers over 15 years old.
• Latin American countries: from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Skill premium is computed as the wage ratio of the high skilled to the medium
skilled.
• East Asian countries: Azam (2010) for India, Ge and Yang (2014) for China,
Di Gropello and Sakellariou (2010) for Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand.
Skill premium is computed as the wage ratio of college graduates to high school
graduates.
As EU KLEMS only contain relevant data to compute the skill premium in as late
as year 2005, the skill premium of the OECD and Eastern European countries in
the end year corresponds to year 2005.
A.3 Simple Model
In this section I derive the equations to illustrate the channels that affect
the skill premium. I assume that there are two countries, N = 2; that there are
two sectors, k = a, b, and sector b is the skill intensive (βbn > β
a
n) and income elastic
(bb > 0 > ba) sector; that value added share is the same across sectors and countries,
vkn = v.
Following Burstein and Vogel (2016), define factor content of trade of factor l
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n, l = U, S
where lkn is the amount of factor l used in the production of sector k goods. The








FCTn(l) > 0 if country n is a net exporter of factor l; and vice versa if country n is
a net importer of factor l.
From the labor market clearing conditions (1.10), equilibrium skill premium











vskn + (1− v)ekn
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n is the average intermediates expenditure share on sector
k. Un−FCTn(U)







captures the effect of domestic expenditure shares.
If expenditure shares are constant, such as in a standard HO model, only changes
in the factor contents of trade affect the skill premium.
Expenditure shares are not constant due to changing household and interme-
diates expenditure shares. Utilizing the identity san + s
b




n = 1, the





vskn + (1− v)ekn
]∑






vsbn + (1− v)ebn
]
1− βan + (βan − βbn) [vsbn + (1− v)ebn]
.
It implies that the changes in the numerator and the denominator due to structural
changes (∆sbn and ∆e
b
n) are opposite in sign. Therefore, I only investigate the
changes in the numerator in the following.
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> 0 so that the skill premium tends to increase.
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ab











































between-sector component is positive, so that reallocation to skill intensive sec-
tors (∆ybn > 0) further raises the skill premium. If firms uses more skill intensive
intermediates overtime within each sector (∆eaan < 0 and ∆e
bb
n > 0), the within-
sector component is positive. The sign of the interaction term is ambiguous, but
the magnitude is likely to be small.
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A.4 Structural Change
I measure the effects of different shocks on structural change by production
reallocation index (PRI), which is defined as
PRIi = 1−
|∆ỹAi −∆yAi |+ |∆ỹMi −∆yMi |+ |∆ỹSi −∆ySi |
|∆yAi |+ |∆yMi |+ |∆ySi |
,
where ∆yki = y
k
i (07) − yki (97) is the observed change in production share, and
∆ỹki = y
k
i (c)−yki (97) is the counterfactual change. PRI has the following properties:
1. PRI ≤ 1; PRI = 1 if the counterfactual predicts the exact changes in pro-
duction shares.
2. PRI = 0 if the counterfactual predicts no changes in production shares.
3. It is possible to have PRI < 0, if the counterfactual predicts much larger
changes in production shares or changes in the opposite direction.
When PRI takes positive value it can be interpreted as the fraction of observed
changes in production shares that is explained by the forces operative in the coun-
terfactual scenario.
Table A.1 presents the implied PRI when each type of shocks is applied individ-
ually to the initial equilibrium. The main observation is that the change in sectoral
production efficiency is the major driver of structural change, while shocks to en-
dowment and SBTC play virtually no roles. Looking at each country, reductions
in trade costs are more important in OECD countries, while sectoral productivity
progress is more important in non-OECD countries.
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Table A.1: Decomposition of PRI across countries
Endowment Trade costs Sectoral tech SBTC Residuals
All 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.00 0.14
AUS -0.03 -0.22 0.19 0.06 0.26
AUT -0.01 0.56 -0.54 0.21 0.56
BEL 0.02 0.32 0.03 -0.05 -0.47
CAN 0.04 0.01 0.88 -0.19 0.16
DEU 0.06 0.45 -0.71 -0.01 0.87
DNK 0.00 -0.35 0.41 -0.07 -0.09
ESP -0.06 0.27 -0.01 0.09 -0.79
FIN -0.01 -0.44 -0.05 -0.02 -0.14
FRA 0.07 0.44 0.48 -0.12 -0.65
GBR 0.02 0.24 0.31 0.02 0.39
GRC 0.01 0.18 0.39 -0.01 0.26
IRL 0.12 -0.48 0.53 0.11 0.46
ITA -0.11 -0.59 0.97 0.10 0.81
JPN -0.22 0.08 -0.53 0.00 -1.28
KOR 0.03 -0.04 0.71 0.00 -0.09
LUX -0.01 0.40 -0.28 0.01 0.31
NLD 0.02 0.29 -0.29 -0.08 0.49
PRT -0.06 0.05 0.84 0.10 0.18
SWE 0.03 0.28 -1.06 0.04 -1.53
USA -0.03 0.49 0.12 -0.01 -1.04
ARG 0.00 -0.08 0.14 0.00 0.69
BRA -0.02 -0.16 0.27 0.01 0.68
CHL 0.02 -0.21 0.54 0.05 -0.17
CHN 0.02 0.39 0.73 -0.01 -0.69
CZE 0.00 0.04 0.42 -0.12 -0.09
HUN 0.04 0.44 0.34 0.02 -0.10
IDN -0.01 -0.11 0.58 0.09 -0.44
IND 0.00 -0.16 0.24 -0.03 0.75
MEX 0.01 -0.07 0.40 -0.01 0.66
PER 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.04 0.49
PHL -0.05 0.33 0.65 -0.04 0.32
POL 0.01 0.28 0.55 -0.01 0.14
SVK 0.00 -0.50 0.47 0.00 -0.17
SVN -0.01 -0.19 0.22 0.13 0.15
THA 0.01 0.22 0.83 -0.01 -0.23
URY 0.04 -0.32 -0.38 -0.22 -0.28
VEN 0.18 -0.01 -0.82 -0.05 -0.57
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A.5 Comparing the Results to Cravino and Sotelo (2016)
As mentioned in the literature review, Cravino and Sotelo (2016) also calcu-
late the effects of trade on the skill premium in the presence of structural change.
I compare my results to them by conducting the same counterfactual exercise in
their work. The counterfactual exercise compares the baseline model to a scenario
where all countries are in autarky. By assuming that the same set of fundamental
shocks are operative in both the baseline and autarky model, including shocks to
endowment, skill intensity, sectoral production efficiency, and residuals, the exercise
computes the effects of trade on the skill premium by obtaining the differential ef-
fects of skill premium implied by the two models under the same set of fundamental
shocks.1 The advantage of this approach is that the effects of trade on the skill
premium can be computed with only information on the changes in sectoral trade
shares and revenue shares. The disadvantage of the approach is that we do know
whether it is technical change or reductions in the trade costs that are driving the
changes in trade and revenue shares.
Column two of Table A.2 presents the effects of trade on the skill premium
under the autarky experiment in my framework. The main observation is that trade
has no effect on the skill premium under the autarky experiment. The reason is that
the same fundamental shocks under the closed and open economy will operate quite
differently. In addition, trade induces structural change due to complementarity
across sectors in Cravino and Sotelo (2016). In my framework, it is mainly due to
1Shocks to trade costs and deficits are set to infinity and zero respectively in the autarky model.
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nonhomothetic preferences, while the force of complementarity between sectors is
small due to the small magnitudes of price elasticities in Table 1.4.
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Table A.2: Effects of trade on the skill premium: comparison
Baseline CS exercise CS results
All 8.31 0.29
All (CS) 8.27 0.37 2.50
AUS 5.62 0.37 0.80
AUT 4.91 -0.09 5.40
BEL 8.27 3.00 2.30
CAN 2.82 -0.36 2.30
DEU 4.06 -1.20
DNK 8.45 1.75 5.30
ESP 10.89 1.36 5.50
FIN 7.45 1.94 1.60
FRA 7.02 1.32 2.50
GBR 6.92 0.96 5.30
GRC 23.44 9.97 14.90
IRL 13.10 5.53 2.20
ITA 7.29 0.68 2.30
JPN 1.16 0.30 -0.10
KOR 4.95 -0.65 -1.00
LUX 17.03 -3.76
NLD 9.27 -2.17 2.40
PRT 9.12 4.69 12.60
SWE 7.32 2.70
USA 2.01 0.89 3.70
ARG 4.25 -3.53
BRA 3.13 -2.12 -1.90
CHL 6.80 -5.11
CHN 20.28 0.15 -2.70
CZE 7.71 -3.48 -1.20
HUN 13.46 -5.91 10.00
IDN 11.49 0.52
IND 8.31 2.34 8.70
MEX 9.38 -1.76 4.40
PER 10.57 -2.33
PHL 29.11 -6.58
POL 19.39 -4.27 14.40





Notes: The first column presents the effects of trade in the baseline counterfactual.
The second column presents the results of the autarky experiment using my frame-
work. The last row presents the results from Cravino and Sotelo (2016). The second
row computes the median value for a set of countries in Cravino and Sotelo (2016).
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A.6 Controling the Effects of Home Technical Change on Trade
One potential drawback of the baseline analysis is that the trade shocks do
not incorporate the effects of home technical change on trade flows. It tends to
over-estimate the effects of trade on the skill premium, as the actual changes in com-
parative advantage due to changes in relative sectoral production efficiency across
countries are exaggerated. As sectoral productivity growth is highest in agriculture
and lowest in services from Table 1.7, only considering foreign technical change as
trade shocks tends to make home country relatively more productive in manufac-
turing and services, so that the home country is more likely to be a net exporter in
skill intensive sectors.
However, home technical change affects the domestic economy regardless of
trade. To overcome this difficulty, I transform the first order effects of shocks on
home production efficiency into an equivalent shock on the bilateral trade cost, such
that these two shocks have the same first order effects on the trade flows at home.
The trade cost equivalent home technology shock has two components, an equivalent
shock on the export cost d̃k−nn, and an equivalent shock on the import cost d̃
k
n−n in
home country n. The idea here is to capture the effects of home technical change
on exports with an equivalent decrease in the costs of exporting, and the effects on
imports with an equivalent increase in the costs of importing.2
To find the export cost equivalent d̃k−nn, I start from (1.7) with country i = n.
2For example, a rise in home production efficiency makes it more difficult for foreign firms to
export to the home country, as if there is an increase in the import cost at home.
138
The first order effect of changes in home sectoral production efficiency T̂ kn on its own
exports is:
d lnπk−nn = d lnT
k
n − d ln Φk−n,
where the second term is the direct effect of home technical change on foreign sectoral


















, the first order





d lnT kn . (A.1)
Similarly, the first order effect of export cost shock d̂k−nn on home’s exports is:




d ln dk−nn, (A.2)
which again includes the direct effect on foreign sectoral prices. Compare (A.1) and






, −n 6= n. (A.3)
Similar procedure applies to the import cost equivalent d̃kn−n. From (1.7)
with country n as the importer, the first order effect of changes in home sectoral
production efficiency T̂ kn on its own imports is:
d ln πkn−n(T̂
k
n ) = −πknnd lnT kn . (A.4)
The only difference from the export case is that home technical change affects im-
ports only through home prices.
For the first order effect of import cost shocks, I have to consider all home
country’s trading partners together, as all import costs affect home price. From
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(1.7), the first order effect of import cost shocks of all trading partners of home
{d̂kn−n}−n is:




d ln dkn−n︸ ︷︷ ︸








, −n 6= n. (A.5)
The effects of {d̂kn−n}−n on imports from country −n consist of two components.
The first component is the direct effect from changes in import costs from country
−n. The second component captures the effect of changes in import costs with
other foreign countries on home price. Compare (A.4) and (A.5), the import cost






, −n 6= n. (A.6)
Expressions (A.3) and (A.6) imply that the trade cost equivalent home tech-
nology shock is:
{d̃k−nn, d̃kn−n} ≡ T̂ kn , −n 6= n. (A.7)
Armed with the trade cost equivalent home technology shocks, I regroup the
shocks into trade and technology:
1. Trade shocks:
• trade cost shocks: {κ̂kmi, τ̂ kmi,∆Dn},
• technology-related trade shocks: {T̂ k−n, d̃k−nn, d̃kn−n};
2. Technology shocks:
• skill biased technical change: ∆βkn,
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The only difference from the baseline grouping is that part of the changes in home
production efficiency is now attributed to trade.3 The labor supply and model
residual shocks remain the same.
I apply the above shocks to the same baseline model, and the results are
presented in Table A.3. Compared with the baseline groups of shocks, now the effects
of trade decline from 8.4% to 4.3%, while the effects of technical change increase
from 1.6% to 5.9%. The difference is due to the smaller effects of technology-related
trade shocks. The exercise shows the importance of controling for the effects of
home technical change on trade flows.










All 8.38 1.56 -0.45 8.03 -3.67 5.34
OECD 7.31 2.29 0.20 6.31 -2.98 5.91
Non-OECD 10.57 1.74 -2.67 13.02 -4.79 4.07
Home tech adjusted
All 4.31 5.86 -0.45 3.92 -0.22 5.34
OECD 4.31 6.46 0.20 3.44 -0.22 5.91
Non-OECD 5.40 3.57 -2.67 5.61 -0.43 4.07
I also do the same exercise on the no structural change model. Table A.4 illus-
3One caveat of the new grouping is that now trade and technology shocks are not orthogonal




are correlated. Therefore I may double count the general
equilibrium effects coming from the trade cost equivalent shocks.
141











All 4.33 2.26 -0.22 4.46 -3.11 5.41
OECD 4.00 3.27 0.06 3.46 -2.78 6.00
Non-OECD 4.52 0.24 -0.87 5.32 -3.92 4.06
Home tech adjusted
All 0.68 4.49 -0.22 0.53 -0.74 5.41
OECD 1.06 5.49 0.06 0.78 -0.64 6.00
Non-OECD 0.42 1.96 -0.87 0.38 -1.44 4.06
trates the results. Though the changes in the skill premium induced by trade and
technical change are quite different under these two grouping schemes, the contri-
bution from structural change is similar. In particular, structural change increases
the skill premium by 4.2% in OECD countries, and 6.7% in non-OECD countries,
compared to 2.3% in OECD 7.7% in non-OECD when the effects of home technical
change on trade flows are not taken into account.
In sum, controling the effects of home technical change on trade flows implies
smaller effects of trade on the skill premium, but the effects remain positive and
economically significant.
142
Appendix B: Intermediates Specialization and Welfare Gains from
Trade
B.1 Data
B.1.1 Cross Country Evidence
We combine 24 GTAP manufacturing industries into 9 industries as below:
Table B.1: GTAP industry classification
GTAP industry codes Description
Food cmt omt vol mil sgr meat, vegetable oil and fats, diary, sugar
pcr ofd b t processed rice, beverages and tobacco
Textile tex wap lea textiles, apparel, leather
Wood lum ppp wood, paper, publishing
Chemical p c crp nmm petroleum, coal products, chemical
rubber, plastic, mineral products
Metal i s nfm fmp Ferrous metals, metal products
Motor mvh otn motor vehicles and parts, transport
Electronic ele equipment, electronic equipment
Machine ome machinery and equipment
Rest manu omf other manufacturing
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B.1.2 US Manufacturing
In NBER CES database, we compute the observed industry production cost
as Enk = matcost+payroll+ invest, and plot the ratio of this observed expenditure
to sales in Figure B.1. We see that this ratio looks fairly constant post 2000, except
Figure B.1: Observed expenditure in production relative to sales: 1995-2009
import penetration in manufacturing































Notes: Import penetration is computed as ratio of total manufacturing import values
to total manufacturing absorption.
in the recessionary years. (In recessions, markup tends to be lower than normal,
which may be the reason why the cost ratio is larger in recessions.)
B.2 Two Stage Production
The two stage production extension is to show that our framework can be
interpreted as firms replace less productive part of the production process with
intermediate inputs, therefore specialization within a firm.
The production has two stages. In the first stage, firms use only labor to
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where zi is production efficiency and li is labor used in type i intermediates. Without
loss of generality we assume production of type 1 intermediates is relatively more
efficient, z1 > z2. In the second stage, firms produce final good by aggregating these
two types of intermediates:
y(ϕ) = ϕx1−α1 x
α
2 (B.2)
Notice that firms are homogeneous in the production of first stage intermediates,
but heterogeneous in productivity at aggregating intermediates as captured by ϕ.
Instead of producing both types of intermediates by itself, firms have the option
to pay a fixed cost of fa units of labor to replace only one type of intermediates
with the market intermediates bundle, which is a CES aggregate of stage two goods







v = 0, no adoption,
1
ϕφ1−αzα2
wαP 1−α v = 1, pay fa and replace x1,
1
ϕφαz1−α1
w1−αPα v = 2, pay fa and replace x2,
where φ is the productivity effect of using the market intermediates bundle. Notice
that for firms to be willing to replace either type of intermediates, we require c0(ϕ) >
c1(ϕ) and c0(ϕ) > c2(ϕ).
We now derive the conditions under which firms always choose to replace type
2 intermediates under adoption. This requires c1(ϕ)
c2(ϕ)
≥ 1. If α ≥ 0.5 as the case in
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where the last step utilizes the assumption that production of type 1 intermediates
is more efficient. If instead α < 0.5, a sufficient condition for c1(ϕ)
c2(ϕ)

















> 1 and 1− 2α > 0.














2 = 1 and setting φ = φ
αz1−α1 give the unit cost in our framework.
Therefore, our model can be interpreted as firms become more specialized in activ-
ities that are more productive within the firm (production of type 1 intermediates
here).
B.3 Equilibrium with Pareto
From demand for the firm q(ϕ) = XP σ−1p(ϕ)−σ, firm sales can be expressed
as


























In addition, from CES demand, yv(ϕ) = σ [πv(ϕ) + wfv], v = n, a, x. Therefore,






Aggregate sales of non-adopters, adopters’ domestic sales and adopters’ export sales
are respectively































































































conditions for productivity thresholds (2.15), (2.10), (2.17). Therefore, the total
sales Y is
Y = Yn + Ya + Yx =
σk





−k + fa (ϕ̄a)












−k + fx (ϕ̄x)
−k
fn (ϕ̄n)
−k + fa (ϕ̄a)
−k + fx (ϕ̄x)
−k . (B.11)
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We can also show that total fixed cost payments F are a constant fraction of
















−k + fa (ϕ̄a)















k − σ + 1
σk
Y. (B.13)












Utilizing the pareto distribution and the productivity thresholds on exporters















− k ln ϕ̄x





















k is a constant. Comparing with the gravity
equation in Chaney (2008), the two trade costs terms τ and fx have the same
elasticity, the price term is the multilateral resistance. The only difference is the
last term involving the labor share, which plays a key role in generating more trade
flows in response to reductions in trade costs.
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B.3.2 Equilibrium
By definition, the price index P is





















































k. We then substitute in the expressions for
productivity thresholds (2.16), (2.11), (2.18), sales share of adopters (B.11), and
labor share (B.14), and arrive at equilibrium price (2.26).
B.4 Calibration Procedure
The model perfectly matches the import penetration 1−λx in each year. The
calibration procedure works as the following:
1. Guess the values of α, fa, and φ.
2. We choose 2000 as our base year, and use data on the fraction of exporters
from Bernard et al. (2007) (χx(00) = 0.18) to pin down the time-invariant
fixed cost of exporting fx as well as solving for the equilibrium. This can be
done with the following steps:
(a) Guess the value of entry cutoff ϕ̄n(00) and sales share of adopters λa(00);
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(c) Find Yn = Y (1− λa) and Ya = Y λx − Yn;
(d) Re-arrange expression (B.7) and solve for the adopter cutoff, ϕ̄a given
the entry cutoff ϕ̄n(00);
(e) Compute the specialization premium and price index using productivity






















(f) Find the implied φ(00) according to sa(00): φ(00) = sa(00)P (00)
α
(g) Check if the following two conditions hold:
Yn + Ya =
σk











if not, start again from step (a).

















where the expressions above utilize the export cutoff (2.18) and the defi-







3. For other years (t 6= 2000), using the value of fx from step 2 and domestic
trade share λx(t), we solve for the equilibrium in year t and find τ(t) with the
following steps:
• Follow steps (a) to (g) but with year t;
















5. Find the values of α, fa, and φ the satisfy (2.54) using numerical derivatives.
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